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### Begin Citation ### Do not delete this line ###
%R 96-10
%U /ftp/pub/WWW/faculty/rapaport/Papers/sspp.ps
%A Rapaport, William J.
%T How Minds Can Be Computational Systems
%D May 31, 1996
%I Department of Computer Science, SUNY Buffalo
%K computationalism, cognitive science, algorthims, heuristics, semiotics
%Y I.2.0;I.2.4
%X The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is 
computable, is presented and defended.  Some arguments of James H. Fetzer
against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive 
theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with 
computationalism.  An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer 
Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, viz., that 
Turing-Test-passing artifacts are persons; it is argued that, whether or 
not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.