From owner-cse575-fa08-list@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Fri Nov 14 10:40:52 2008 Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:40:44 -0500 From: dpatrone@buffalo.edu Subject: CSE575: Fodor To: CSE575-FA08-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU It seems to me that there are some clear cases where the external environment *must* have an impact on a person's behavior regardless of their internal beliefs. Or perhaps I am just thinking of it incorrectly... Based on Fodor's rules (from the Methodological Solipsism paper): (a) If it's the case that P, do such and such. (b) If you believe it's the case that P, do such and such. (c) Do such and such if it's the case that P, whether or not you believe that it's the case that P. What if P = "gravity does not work on me", and "such and such" = "fly around". In the external environment P is false, so (a) and (c) are can be ignored. But doesn't Fodor imply (if its only my internal representation that matters) that for (b) if I *believe* that gravity does not work on me (making the antecedent true) I should be able to fly around? I feel like that can't be what he is saying, but then I don't see what he is saying. Am I missing something? Thanks, Dennis From owner-cse575-fa08-list@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Mon Nov 17 09:36:13 2008 Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2008 09:36:00 -0500 From: "William J. Rapaport" Subject: Re: CSE575: Fodor To: CSE575-FA08-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU > Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:40:44 -0500 > From: dpatrone@buffalo.edu > Subject: CSE575: Fodor > > It seems to me that there are some clear cases where the external > environment *must* have an impact on a person's behavior regardless > of their internal beliefs. Or perhaps I am just thinking of it > incorrectly... I don't think that you're thinking about it incorrectly, but I think we need to be a bit more precise: The behavior in question has to be psychological behavior, not (just) physical behavior, and the aspects of the external environment need to be those relevant to one's psychological behavior. > Based on Fodor's rules (from the Methodological Solipsism paper): > (a) If it's the case that P, do such and such. > (b) If you believe it's the case that P, do such and such. > (c) Do such and such if it's the case that P, whether or not you > believe that it's the case that P. > > What if P = "gravity does not work on me", and "such and such" = > "fly around". > > In the external environment P is false, so (a) and (c) are can be > ignored. But doesn't Fodor imply (if its only my internal > representation that matters) that for (b) if I *believe* that > gravity does not work on me (making the antecedent true) I > should be able to fly around? This, I think, is correct and consistent with Fodor: Believing that you'll be able to fly is indeed a psychological state; moreover, it will lead you to try certain physical behaviors (such as trying to fly): Again, it's your "internal" beliefs that produce your psychological behavior, not the way the (external) world is. From owner-cse575-fa08-list@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Mon Nov 17 19:14:29 2008 Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2008 19:14:21 -0500 From: "William J. Rapaport" Subject: Re: CSE575: Fodor To: CSE575-FA08-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU A student writes: > So by "psychological behavor" do you mean only that "behavior" that is > purely "psychological" such as that conducted in oour dream states? I > fly in my dreams when I believe I can. If so, then do we need a > slightly more precise term to delineate "psychologically" motivated > physical behavior" or some such moniker? All I meant was the kind of behavior that cognitive scientists (and even "behaviorists") are interested in (thinking, reasoning, perceiving, learning, etc.), together with those behaviors that are due to such states (e.g., asking to meet the person who lives next door because of a belief about who that person is), rather than the kind of behavior that, say, physical therapists are interested in (such as walking, running, etc.). > > Quoting "William J. Rapaport" : > > >> Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 10:40:44 -0500 > >> From: dpatrone@buffalo.edu > >> Subject: CSE575: Fodor > >> > >> It seems to me that there are some clear cases where the external > >> environment *must* have an impact on a person's behavior regardless > >> of their internal beliefs. Or perhaps I am just thinking of it > >> incorrectly... > > > > I don't think that you're thinking about it incorrectly, but I think > > we need to be a bit more precise: The behavior in question has to be > > psychological behavior, not (just) physical behavior, and the aspects > > of the external environment need to be those relevant to one's > > psychological behavior. From owner-cse575-fa08-list@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Tue Nov 18 20:33:27 2008 Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2008 20:33:19 -0500 From: "William J. Rapaport" Subject: Re: CSE575: Fodor To: CSE575-FA08-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU A student writes again: > That certainly makes more than how I was thinking about it, but I'm still > not completely satisfied... ;-) > > Wasn't the original purpose to determine the "mental causation of > behavior"? Aren't we now just looking at the mental causation of *mental > thoughts*? > > How do you measure "psychological behavior" if it isn't the observable > actions based on those psychological behaviors? So now we need to go an > extra step and back-track the action (running around the room flapping your > arms) to the mental state (I can fly) to see the result of the original > belief (gravity does not work on me)? Or look at neurons firing? Or ask > the person what are you thinking? Or... > > That seems to muddy the waters a bit. And even if it does help to explain > observed (past tense) behavior based on an assumed mental state, I think > it's even harder to be extend this to a predictive model-- "what will the > behavior be if..." (but then, maybe thats not the point?) > > This is some crazy stuff! I think we're getting too far away from what Fodor actually says and what his actual point is. He says (p.326): "Suppose...that mental processes are algorithms", in particular, like production rules of the form: If condition, then action. And he asks us to consider the difference between such mental processes as: (a) If it's the case that P, do such and such. (b) If you believe it's the case that P, do such and such. Now let's consider P = "gravity doesn't work on me" and "such and such" = "fly". (a') If gravity doesn't work on me, then fly. (b') If I believe that gravity doesn't work on me, then fly. Suppose you see me running around, flapping my arms, and jumping (unsuccessfully trying to fly). Which of these explains my behavior? Only (b'). That's Fodor's point. From owner-cse575-fa08-list@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Wed Nov 19 08:06:50 2008 Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2008 07:56:41 -0500 From: Dennis Patrone Subject: Re: CSE575: Fodor To: CSE575-FA08-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU > Now let's consider P = "gravity doesn't work on me" and "such and such" > = "fly". > > (a') If gravity doesn't work on me, then fly. > (b') If I believe that gravity doesn't work on me, then fly. > > Suppose you see me running around, flapping my arms, and jumping > (unsuccessfully trying to fly). Which of these explains my behavior? > Only (b'). That's Fodor's point. > And my point was, isn't really (b') *and* the real world. If it really were the case of (a') then your behavior (actually be flying around) would be different than your current behavior (to be running around, flapping your arms, and jumping). So the environment affects your behavior, regardless of what you think. From owner-cse575-fa08-list@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Wed Nov 19 10:28:18 2008 Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2008 10:27:59 -0500 From: "William J. Rapaport" Subject: Re: CSE575: Fodor To: CSE575-FA08-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU On Nov 19, 2008, at 7:56 AM, Dennis Patrone wrote: > > >Now let's consider P = "gravity doesn't work on me" and "such and > such" > >= "fly". > > >(a') If gravity doesn't work on me, then fly. > >(b') If I believe that gravity doesn't work on me, then fly. > > >Suppose you see me running around, flapping my arms, and jumping > >(unsuccessfully trying to fly). Which of these explains my behavior? > >Only (b'). That's Fodor's point. > > And my point was, isn't really (b') *and* the real world. > > If it really were the case of (a') then your behavior (actually be > flying around) would be different than your current behavior (to be > running around, flapping your arms, and jumping). So the > environment affects your behavior, regardless of what you think. > > I don't think the real world explains why you're flapping your arms and trying to fly. It does, however, explain why you're not succeeding.