Theory of Mind

"Scientists used to think that we understand each other by observing each other and building hypotheses from the accumulated data. Now it seems more likely that we are, essentially, method actors who understand others by simulating the responses we see in them."

— Brooks, David (2011), "Social Animal: How the New Sciences of Human Nature Can Help Make Sense of a Life", New Yorker (17 January): 26–32; quote on p. 28.

1. Dennett, Daniel C. (1971), "Intentional Systems", Journal of Philosophy 68: 87-106; reprinted in Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books): 3-22.
   • On the meaning of ‘intentional’ and the difference between ‘intensional’ and ‘intentional’, see:

     Intensionality vs. Intentionality

2. From:
   Wilson, Robert A.; & Keil, Frank C. (eds.) (2001), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
   1. Baker, Lynne Rudder, "Folk Psychology".

   2. Gopnik, Alison, "Theory of Mind".

   3. Gordon, Robert M., "Simulation vs. Theory-Theory".

3. Origgi, Gloria (2002), "Theories of Theory of Mind", from Nani, Marco, & Marraffa, Massimo (eds.), "A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind".

4. Gordon, Robert M. (2004), "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

5. Ravenscroft, Ian (2004), "Folk Psychology as a Theory", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

6. Gordon, Robert M. (2005), "Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds"

7. Perner, Josef; Mauer, M. Christine; & Hildenbrand, Monika (2011), "Identity: Key to Children's Understanding of Belief", Science 333(6041) (22 July): 474–477.
   • Ties false-belief experiments to intensional identities.

8. Gopnik, Alison (2012), "Scientific Thinking in Young Children: Theoretical Advances, Empirical Research, and Policy Implications", Science 337(6102) (28 September): 1623–1627.