Subject: Bitstream Representation & Consciousness (long message) From: "William J. Rapaport" Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 08:43:14 -0500 Prof. Peter Scott (CSE) sent me the following query: -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Query Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:14:47 -0500 From: Peter Scott To: William J Rapaport Hi Bill: In seminar last week a student reviewing some current issues in steganography suggested a certain technique could be applied " ... to any message that could be represented as a bit stream." I challenged the class to think about the question whether there were any messages that could not be so represented, and if so, what is their nature? My view on this is that it depends upon the definition of message, but that with any reasonably broad such definition there are messages that cannot be represented as bit streams. These messages include the internal signals of consciousness. But this view is not based on any deep scholarship, just a sense of the nature of computational consciousness from reading Searle and Quine. Do you have a view on this question? If so, would you be willing to share with us? I have asked the students to email me their theses on this subject, limited to a few paragraphs, and I would post them on our seminar course website. I would love to post yours along with theirs and mine if you would care to participate. -Peter --------------------------------- I replied as follows: -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: Query Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 11:11:09 -0500 From: William J. Rapaport Reply-To: rapaport@buffalo.edu Organization: SUNY Buffalo CSE To: Peter Scott References: <4AF03AD7.9040405@buffalo.edu> Peter: Here are some quick observations. First, let's consider messages that are "external" to an agent's mind. My first reaction to the claim that there are (external) messages that cannot be represented by a bitstream was that perhaps analog messages (e.g., pictures, sounds) might not be thus representable. But if you're willing to allow digital versions of them (and why wouldn't you?), then I think that it's highly unlikely that there are any messages that couldn't be represented in a bitstream, and probably there aren't any. Now let's consider messages that are "internal" to an agent. Certainly, any physically realizable signal, e.g., a nerve signal, ought to be representable by a bitstream. Again, we might have to settle for a digital version of it, but that seems acceptable to me. Even a chemical signal could be representable by a string representing its chemical analysis, perhaps. What of "internal signals of consciousness"? Well, I'm not sure what you have in mind here. The current literature on consciousness seems to be pretty much in agreement that there are two kinds of consciousness: "access" consciousness and "phenomenal" consciousness. The former is what psychologists study and that can be expressed in a functional-computational theory. E.g., John Anderson's ACT-R system is said by him to be conscious in this sense, because there are messages that are globally accessible to all parts of the cognitive architecture. Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective feeling that is associated with (some or all) conscious states; it also goes by the name "qualia". Some researchers claim that it is not reducible to, or explainable in terms of, access consciousness (Chalmers). Others claim that it is (McDermott). Still others claim that there's no such thing, but that we only think there is (Dennett). I would say that internal signals of access consciousness, because they are reducible to neuron firings, would be bitstream representable. As for qualia, only those who believe that they exist and are not reducible to neuron firings would need to answer the question. But because no one has a theory about what they are (well, I'm working on one, but...), I think this question needs to remain open. May I forward your query (and my response) to my consciousness seminar, and ask them to respond, too? -Bill -------------------------------------------- To which, Peter replied: -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: Query Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 11:43:27 -0500 From: Peter Scott To: rapaport@buffalo.edu Hi Bill: That would be great, tell them to send their responses to me and I will post them on our seminar website http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/courses/cse725/peter/. Can I post your reply below there? Also, I completely agree with your observation that any but those messages denoted as "qualia," whether analog or digital, can be represented as bitstreams. That is what I meant by "internal signals of consciousness," along perhaps with the messages of the will associated with Schopenhauer's dichotomy of the world presenting itself to us as Representation and Will, or those of Freud's Id. Not sure whether those would be considered qualia or not, but they share its character if not. It is indeed an open and profound question I think, whether a reductionist analysis of these things to objective physico-chemical phenomena in the brain will finally succeed. So as you say, the question is surely still open! Thanks. -peter -------------------------------------------- So: If any of you care to comment, please do so via "reply all", so that everyone in CSE 719 as well as Peter Scott can join in on the conversation. -Bill Subject: [Fwd: CSE725 Bitstream Discussion] From: "William J. Rapaport" Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 11:23:52 -0500 -------- Original Message -------- Subject: CSE725 Bitstream Discussion Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 11:08:58 -0500 From: Peter Scott To: William J Rapaport Hi Bill: I attach a link to the responses thus far to my bitstream-completeness query. Please invite your seminar students to read, and to join in if they wish by sending me an email with their responses which I will then add. -Peter http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/courses/cse725/peter/Q&A.html