Descartes

1. Hatfield, Gary (2009), "René Descartes", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

2. Meditations (trilingual edition)
   • "I think; therefore, I am" ("Cogito ergo sum")

   • 
   1. Meditation 1
   2. Meditation 2

3. Discourse on Method for Reasoning Well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences
   1. Scroll to Part Five, paragraph beginning "None of this will seem strange…"
   • Cf. Nagel, Thomas (1970), "Armstrong on the Mind", Philosophical Review 79(3) (July): 394–403:
     • "…some philosophers would maintain that we know that the disembodied existence of the mind is conceivable. The latter, stronger thesis is the basis of Descartes's proof that the mind and the body are distinct. He did not hold merely that the mind might, for all we know, be something distinct from the body and therefore in principle capable of independent existence. Rather he held that we can without difficulty conceive of its independent existence, and therefore it must be something distinct from the body. …

       "Descartes's argument also has the following turned-around version, which to my knowledge he never employed. The existence of the body without the mind is just as conceivable as the existence of the mind without the body. That is, I can conceive of my body doing precisely what it is doing now, inside and out, with complete physical causation of its behavior (including typically self-conscious behavior), but without any of the mental states which I am now experiencing, or any others, for that matter. If that is really conceivable, then the mental states must be distinct from the body's physical states…."

4. Rapaport's writings on Descartes (for what they're worth :-):
   1. Rapaport, William J. (1976), "On Cogito Propositions", Philosophical Studies 29: 63–68.
      • Abstract: I argue that George Nakhnikian's analysis of the logic of cogito propositions (roughly, Descartes's 'cogito' and 'sum') is incomplete. The incompleteness is rectified by showing that disjunctions of cogito propositions with contingent, non-cogito propositions satisfy conditions of incorrigibility, self-certifyingness, and pragmatic consistency; hence, they belong to the class of propositions with whose help a complete characterization of cogito propositions is made possible.

   2. Rapaport, William J. (1987), "God, the Demon, and the Cogito" (unpublished ms.)
      • Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to exhibit in detail the setting for the version of the Cogito Argument that appears in Descartes's Meditations. I believe that a close rading of the text can shed new light on the nature and role of the "evil demon", on the nature of God as he appears in the first few Meditations, and on the place of the Cogito Argument in Descartes's overall scheme.