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Principles of Philosophical Reasoning

Edited by

JAMES H. FETZER

H.-N. CASTAÑEDA,
" PHILOSOPHICAL
REFUTATIONS "

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Preface

The purpose of this anthology is to present a collection of original articles devoted to exploring the existence and character of distinctively philosophical principles of inference and patterns of argument in an endeavor to better understand the theoretical structure of philosophical reasoning. Part One consists of five investigations concerning modes of reasoning that might be viewed as potential candidates within such a context, including the Socratic method (of questions and answers), deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, infinite regress arguments, and appeals to Ockham's Razor. Part Two consists of five additional investigations concerning relations between modes of reasoning as they occur in science and in philosophy, including the exchange of language frameworks, the method of counterexample, explanation in philosophy and in science, transcendental, dialectical and scientific reasoning, and theoretical reasoning, in general. The collection begins with a critical introduction and ends with an attempt to evaluate the philosophical significance of appeals to ordinary language by a comparison with scientific methodology.

The conception of this project originated with George Schlesinger, who suggested that we co-edit an anthology with this specific theme. We agreed to work together but, during our deliberations, arrived at the decision that George would be a double contributor, while I would become the book's editor. In that capacity, I have assumed responsibility for the organization and the contents of this collection, at least to the extent to which its contributors have been responsive to editorial invitations. I am grateful to the one who met every deadline and fulfilled every obligation as well as to the many who did not: but for them, we would have no anthology at all. I have

38. Gadamer 1980, p. 96.
39. MacIntyre makes this point (MacIntyre 1981, p. 96).
40. Ryle seems to take this conventionalist approach (Ryle 1949, pp. 122–124).
41. Carnap, "Empiricism," in Carnap 1956.
42. Heidegger 1962, p. 34.
43. Toulmin 1972.
44. Whitehead 1929, pp. 523–27.
45. Monod 1972, pp. 2–44.
46. Davidson 1980, pp. 3–19.
47. Ryle 1949, pp. 86–92.
48. Goldman 1970, pp. 137–69.
49. Davidson 1980, p. 79.
50. Goldman 1970, pp. 59–61.
51. Sartre 1966, p. 478.
52. Ryle, for example, asserts the first condition, but fails to assert the second (Ryle 1949, p. 127).
53. Austin 1961b, pp. 153–80.
54. Austin 1961b.
55. This is what motivates Strawson to reject Kant's transcendental idealism, thereby eliminating any supposedly "subjective origin" for the *a priori* conditions of objective reality (Strawson 1966, pp. 235–73).
56. C. D. Broad, "Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism," in Broad 1952a, pp. 195–217.
57. Strawson argues this quite effectively (Strawson 1966, p. 146).
58. Derrida 1976, p. 12.
59. Heidegger 1962, pp. 244–73; Peirce 1965, vol. I, pp. 173–80.
60. Wittgenstein attempted something like this in the *Tractatus* (1961, paragraphs 5.6–5.64).
61. Gadamer points out not only what the ramifications of this formulation of the principle of identity are in Platonic thought, but also how Hegel completely misunderstood what Plato was saying (Gadamer 1980, p. 22).
62. Heidegger 1969, pp. 23–25.
63. Hegel 1967, pp. 789–808.
64. Heidegger 1966, pp. 43–57.
65. Derrida 1976, p. 23.
66. Derrida 1976, p. 24.
67. Kojève 1969, p. 207; Habermas 1979, p. 68; Popper and Eccles 1977, p. 47.
68. Popper and Eccles 1977, p. 48.
69. Derrida 1976, p. 50.
70. Kojève contrasts Plato and Hegel in this way (Kojève 1969, pp. 179–81).
71. Berggren 1962–63, Parts I & II.
72. Bogen argues this point effectively in opposition to Melden (Bogen, "Physical Determinism," in Care and Landesman 1968); Melden, *Free Action* 1961.
73. Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 434–41.
74. Derrida develops this notion of a trace (Derrida 1976, p. 61).
75. Sartre 1966, pp. 303–51; Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 148–73.
76. Whitehead 1929, p. 208.

11   Philosophical Refutations

Hector-Neri Castaneda

Philosophical Method has the anti-Augustinian property. When somebody asks me about philosophical method I know what it is. But when nobody asks me and I am philosophizing, I often do not know what it is.

Oscar Thend, *On Philosophical Method*

Ce n'est pas Gäste qui exprime le pluriel, mais l'opposition *Gast:Gäste*.

Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique generale*

Thus, it became evident to me that it was necessary to resort to words (and concepts), sentences (and propositions), and reasonings to study in them the truth of realities.

Plato, *Phaedo* 99E

1. Introduction

The central problems of philosophy are perennial. Why? Problems and views recede from the center of dispute, only to dominate the scene later on. Why don't theories stay refuted, and problems dissolved?

Refutation is more than 80 percent of what goes on in so-called analytic philosophy, yet the theory of refutation of philosophical theories or views has received scanty attention. Attacks on method have, of course, a trailing view on the nature of refutation. And views on philosophical method have an implicit companion view on philosophical refutation. Thus, many valuable remarks on

philosophical refutation are dispersed throughout the major philosophical contributions. Here I propose to engage in an exegesis and assessment of some of the most commonly practiced techniques of refutation. I offer a collection of data for the general theory of philosophical refutation.

In particular, I want to examine the scope and function of the following techniques: Appeals to Ockham's Razor; Spurious Demands of Deductive Proof; the Coffee-Pot Approach; Counterexampling; the Divide-and-Conquer Technique; the Bypassing Attacks; Guilty-by-Association Attacks. My diagnosis is that often these refutational techniques create much more obscurity than illumination. The fruitful role of counterexampling is not exactly what some of its practitioners take it to be. Indeed, philosophical refutation is a chimera.

Refutation is the obverse side of method. It is the topic of Negative Meta-philosophy. But it needs to be treated as a genuine topic, not merely by default. Nevertheless, the proper method of a field of study is the entry to the refutation proprietary to that field. However, as my friend Oscar Thend hasn't tired of insisting, philosophical method has the anti-Augustinian property. We must consider a particular problem when we are discussing method. Therefore, we must enter any discussion of philosophical refutation via the exegesis of some philosophical problem. Here we enter the discussion through the well known "Paradox of Reference," which by being well known should provide an easy start.

2. A Perennial Problem: The Structure of the World

A method is good—or bad—depending on the purpose it serves. Philosophical method is no exception. In philosophy there are many fields, and within them many different programs have been pursued. There is, however, *one* philosophical objective that has stood at the center of philosophical activity throughout history, namely: to understand as fully as it is feasible the structure of the world and of our experience of it. This objective has demarcated a network of problems in the field that has been called ontology, more precisely, phenomenological ontology, the ontology of experience. That field is different from metaphysical ontology, the study of the underlying reality of both world and experience as it might be in itself, independently of its being experienced. By

experience here is meant the totality of our dealings with the world. Thus, in phenomenological ontology we seek to unravel the most pervasive patterns of the different types of experience: perceptual, scientific, aesthetic, moral, political, religious, erotic, poetic, ludic, etc. We aim, as ontologists, to propose views or hypotheses about the contours of those patterns, which, regardless of the particular contents of a particular experience, are constitutive of such experiences. Our ultimate goal is, of course, to formulate *the* master theory of the world and experience that integrates all those hypotheses into a coherent, comprehensive, and unified picture of the grand design of the world and our experience of it.

But what right do we have to speak of "*the* master theory"? May we assume that our local and unrelated hypotheses about different segments of that grand design will fit together harmoniously? No, indeed. We have *no* right to assume that there *is* one master theory at the end of our research, awaiting the completion of our efforts. Likewise, we have *no* right to assume there is *not* just one master theory at the end as an asymptotic limit of our collective endeavours.

Evidently, the philosophical, structural theories we hypothesize must perforce be *tentative*, subject to the modifications required by their embedding in more comprehensive theories. *Embedment in a more comprehensive theory is, at bottom, the fundamental test of fruitfulness. hence, of genuine adequacy, of a theory.*

The hypothetical character of ontological theorizing, together with the enormous magnitude of the world, demand both humility and respect for *each* of the well-knit comprehensive alternative theories built upon a rich, variegated, and complex data base. Consequently, one of the most important timely theses about the methodology of ontology (and of metaphysics) is this: the most urgent philosophical NEED is the development of *all* the comprehensive theories that the *cumulation* of *all* of the data at present available allow for. This methodological pluralism surges from the idea that *before* we have produced a total theory of the world and of experience, we cannot be sure which of the many partial theories on one problem, even a theory on many problems, can be extended. coherently and adequately, to a total theory. There is at least the thinkable, but unprovable, possibility that there may be not just one, but *many* total theories of the world and of experience. *If* this is so, then our methodological pluralism is undergirded by a

deep-seated ontological pluralism. *If* this is how things stand between the world and ourselves, then all the different theories of the world and of experience *must* be developed in full detail. Then, our partial theories should be extended more and more so as to make them more and more comprehensive. These elementary points have several crucial consequences.

For one thing, the most satisfying philosophical experience is to be able to see the world in different ways. In Wittgenstein's analogy with the duck-rabbit design, the one and external reality is better understood if we can see it now as having the full "duck" depicted in a comprehensive theory, and now as being the full "rabbit" depicted in another theory—and, indeed, the whole of the other designs that other master theories depict, or, better, allow to come forth.

Second, the philosophical task of our times should be the enrichment of our arsenal of *comprehensive* theories. The petty disputes between two very local and small theories should be overcome in the process of building larger and larger theories. All the totally comprehensive theories are precisely in the same boat as master designs of the world, through which reality allows itself to appear. The same holds for comprehensive partial theories catering to the same rich data.

For obvious professional reasons philosophers tend to work on fashionable problems within the fashionable views. This is most reasonable. Fashions are magnificent stimulants of progress. They mobilize a large amount of the needed cooperation for the full development of certain approaches. Yet fashions are often not pluralistic enough but are, instead, very constrictive. To stimulate the development of the exciting and rewarding comprehensive systems of the world and experience we urgently need, we must not merely be tolerant of but be actually supportive of the unfashionable approaches. (Fortunately, some of us can afford to work outside the dominant streams of philosophical research of our time.) At each time, all the encompassing theories singing to the same rich data base are voices in one and the same philosophical symphony.[1]

3. Philosphical Data

Because of their maximal generality and pervasiveness, ontic structures can be found anywhere, underlying any claim whatever we make about reality, or even about irreality and fiction. Any experience whatever, any object whatever, any entity whatever is a source of philosophical questions. Consider, for instance, a *comma,* the one after the italicized token of *'comma'* that the read will perceive. By then it will have endured and will have a history. It is an intersubjective entity. Here we have quite a number of pervasive structures that need understanding and clarification: having properties; being a subject of relations; being part of several persons' visual fields; coming into existence; having a history; being a subject of change; having causal connections; being an individual object, rather than a property; etc.

That tiny comma is, furthermore, enveloped by a complicated network of deep structures through which it is a token of a linguistic sign. Patently, that comma is a linguistic token by appearing in the midst of strings of marks that count as English words. Thus, that comma, as a linguistic token, sits at the convergence of phonetic structures that are themselves molded as linguistic units by syntactic and semantic structures. And, of course, semantic structures are such because they represent, and are causally involved with, the more pervasive structures that connect the mental with the physical.

Evidently, any physical object whatever gives rise to one and the same battery of philosophical questions. This has sometimes been misinterpreted as philosophy being an entirely *a priori* discipline in need of no empirical data. The situation as just described belies this conclusion. We *can* start our philosophical questioning with *any* physical object whatever in its empirical context as it is at a given time; but so to start is to start with empirical data. We must distinguish between the pervasiveness of certain data and the nonempirical character of the data. Philosophy needs the *initial empirical and existential assumption* that the universe contains certain particular entities. Basic descriptions of particular entities are at the basis of philosophical investigation.

Yet a fruitful philosophical investigation cannot be based on a short description of a particular entity. The structures we investigate as philosophers span the whole universe, regardless of how vividly and concentrated those structures may be represented at the entity we have selected as a starting point. The universal structures we want to understand may be more tortuous and circuitous than may appear at any particular juncture. To illustrate, the above example of a comma, as well as any other physical object whatever,

may initially suggest that perhaps what accounts for the comma's individuality is also what accounts for its being a subject of change, and also for the comma's having causal connections, for its occupying a place and time, for its unity as an entity, for its perceptibility, etc. A careful reflection, comparing the situation of the comma with the situations of other entities, especially the ones to which it is related throughout its career, reveals that those general structural features of the comma cannot be simply accounted for in the same way. The structures are *more complex* than they appear at their intersection at each physical object—or psychic entity, for that matter. Consequently, those structures must be studied *in the context* of many and variegated entities and their relationships.

Philosophical data are, then, each of the entities we find in the universe and each of their properties and relations. Ordinary facts of experience, general facts discovered by observation, and more general facts postulated by science, are all philosophical data. But there is another most (caution: most, *not* more) important type of philosphical datum, namely, the *semantico-syntactical contrasts of ordinary language*, especially in one's own idiolects—as they manifest themselves in large linguistic contexts. Just as we must consider networks of objects to glean the ontic structures involving them, we must consider, *not* mere isolated sentences, let alone words or other single expressions, but networks of sentences and of *discourses* in which significant portions of ontic structure are depicted. The structure of the world we face in experience, and of the experience through which we encounter reality, is precisely the structure of *all* the semantico-syntactic contrasts of the language through which we have that encounter.[2]

4. Our Entry Case: The "Paradox of Reference"

Given that the fundamental structures of the world impinge on and converge at particulars, the nature of our reference to particulars and the nature of the particulars we refer to constitute major problems in phenomenological ontology, in phenomenological linguistics, and in theory of the referring mind. These problems can be found in reasonably complex cases of reference. Consider, for example, the following situation:

(1)   Jocasta, at the beginning of the pestilence, believed that both (a) Oedipus's father was (the same as) Oedipus's father and (b) Oedipus's father was not (the same as) the previous King of Thebes.

(2)   Oedipus's father was (the same as) the previous King of Thebes [or so we believe].

(3)   Jocasta's belief as reported in (1) is self-consistent.

(T1)   For any individuals x and y: if x is (genuinely or strictly) identical with y, then whatever is true of x is true of y, and vice versa.

(T2)   The sentential matrix (like other similar expressions in which 'blanks' *not* mentioned but used in (1)) "Jocasta, at the beginning of the pestilence, believed that: both (a) Oedipus's father was (the same as) Oedipus's father and (b) Oedipus's father was not (the same as) _____" expresses something true of the individual such that an expression used to refer to it put in the blank in the matrix yields a sentence expressing a truth.

(T3)   The expression "was (the same as)" in premise (2) denotes (or expresses) strict or genuine identity, governed by (T1).

By (T2), premise (1) expresses something true of the individual, the previous King of Thebes. By (T1) and (T3) whatever is true of this individual is true of the individual Oedipus's father. Hence, by (T2) and (2), the sentence (4) below should express the same truth that (1) expresses about the previous King of Thebes, except that it should not be a truth about the individual Oedipus's father:

(4)   Jocasta, at the beginning of the pestilence, believed that: both (a) Oedipus's father was (the same as) Oedipus's father, and (b) Oedipus's father was not (the same as) Oedipus's father.

But (4) contradicts (3). This is one case of the "Paradox of Reference." There are other cases.

Patently, when we confront a contradiction, we must give up something. What?

5. Logical and Theoretical Exegesis of the "Paradox of Reference"

Logically, the situation is simply that on the more or less standard logic we have taken for granted, the set of propositions (1), (2),

(3), (T1), (T2), and (T3) imply a contradiction. Hence, logically, we must renounce at least one of these six premises. Of course, we can *also* change our logic. But logic does not tell us which of the premises we must renounce. For this we must make a *theoretical decision*. As far as I can see, we have, therefore, in principle (at least) *six* different types of theory that just within the present datum seem initially plausible. Here is the juncture at which the fashions step in. It is nowadays most fashionable to say that psychological matrices like the one referred to in (T2) do not express properties of objects. This is immaterial; for nothing in the above derivation of the contradiction hinges on the word 'property,' which was deliberately left unused. The point must be that psychological sentences cannot express anything true, or false, of individuals that at all appearances are mentioned in them. Another fashionable thing to say is that Leibniz's law, a name given to (T1), does not apply in psychological contexts, like (1). It is also generally fashionable to accept premises (1)–(3).

My meta-philosophical position here includes two tenets. *First,* it seems to me utterly irresponsible to claim to "solve" the "paradox" by *simply* rejecting (T1) or (T2). The serious rejection of *any* of the six premises of the "paradox" carries with it the commitment to develop a theory that deal with the problems that lurk behind the "paradox." These problems are initially three: (i) What is it to be an individual? (ii) What is it to have properties, or having something true of it? (iii) What is identity? These are the problems of *individuation, predication,* and *identity.* But as already hinted at, the problem of propertyhood is there, too, just as much as the problem of *truth.* Futhermore, since we want the *whole* world and the *whole* of experience to come out as the detailed topic of a master all-encompassing theory, *any* theory that rejects any one of the six premises of the "paradox" has to be embedded in more and more comprehensive theories.

Which approach is better? Who knows? I want *all* the six initially plausible approaches to be pursued as far as they can. Perhaps some of them will conflate; and some of them will branch out into sub-approaches. In my view of philosphy *none* should be spared until it collapses of its own weight. This is my *second* tenet.

One note may not be amiss. The nonfashionable approaches will not be easily pursued. Thus, two interesting programs can be

neglected. One program—the one I have spent more time developing under the title *Guise Theory*—takes as departure point premise (T3). According to this approach, the individuals—Oedipus's father and the previous King of Thebes—are the same, as established by premise (2), but they are not strictly identical. Hence, since strict identity is governed by a wholly unrestricted application of (T1), they are the same in a form of sameness not governed by (T1). The other nonfashionable approach rejects premise (3). I would like this approach to be developed with views on identity, individuation, predication, reference, truth, etc.

One important methodological point is worth recording. Many a researcher feels obliged to refute alternative views before he/she develops a new one. This has one advantage, namely, that their research cannot help taking into account the data on which the theories he/she attacks are erected. (It does not guarantee that, of course.) But such proceedings have one defect. Often the researcher forgets that a partial theory cannot be erected upon a refutation of alternative approaches. An approach that seems defeated at a given time, because the theories embodying it are cumbersome, may, in the very aspects that make it cumbersome, contain structures that will be useful for explaining additional data. Later on the approach is revived, perhaps deprived of some old assumptions. And the merry-go-round starts all over again. Given that we only have partial theories to be embedded in more encompassing ones, and we cannot predict that other theories cannot be embedded within larger ones, even if with some revisions, there is *no* need as such to refute the existing, or prospective alternatives. *What is needed is a theorization catering to large collections of rich and complex data:* all the data available at the time of theorization. We need comprehensive theories.

6. The World-Mind Tension at the Core of the "Paradox of Reference"

The preceding determination of (at least) six initially plausible approaches to the "paradox of reference" was mechanical: Six premises, six approaches. This robotlike analysis was tempered by the remark that none of the six approaches is worth considering seriously, unless it is developed to the point of dealing with the structural problems above mentioned (predication, individuation, etc.).

We can obtain a more direct guidance from the "paradox" by asking ourselves: What exactly is the tension, the paradoxical tension depicted in the "paradox"? A little reflection reveals that the crucial tension in the "paradox" is the tension between the *sameness* between Oedipus's father and the previous King of Thebes proclaimed by premise (2), and the *non-sameness*, the difference between these two proclaimed by premise (1). Whereas premise (2) asserts that *somehow* in the real world [or in the beliefs of those persons who believe (1)–(3)] Oedipus's father and the previous King of Thebes are the same, premise (1) reports that, as far as Jocasta's beliefs are concerned, these two individuals are not the same. The solution to the "paradox" cannot simply consist of rejecting one of the premises. It must consist of a theory that resolves the conflict between the *worldly sameness* of premise (2) and the *epistemic sameness*, or lack thereof, involved in premise (1). Patently, this requires a theory as to how the world [or we the speakers] and (Jocasta's) mind connect. Clearly, the tension arises because of the finitude of Jocasta's mind. Her mind is, or has, a representation of the world, but only a cursory representation, a finite one. These are the profound issues underlying the "paradox of reference." The total solution is, consequently, a total theory of the world and of our experience of it. Can we be happy with anything less? At least the largest structures should be included in any significant solution.

7. The Fregean Sense/Referent Solution and Guise Theory

Frege thought seriously and deeply about the "paradox." For that reason it is justified that some philosophers refer to it as "Frege's Paradox." His solution seems to me brilliant. It goes directly to the heart of the issue: the tension between wordly sameness and epistemic sameness. (The expressions are mine, however.) Frege solves the tension by assigning different individuals to the two samenesses in question. The worldly sameness proclaimed by premise (2) is strict identity, governed by Leibniz's law (T1), and it holds in what he calls the (primary) *referents* of the two terms 'Oedipus's father' and 'the previous King of Thebes.' On the other hand, the non-sameness proclaimed by premise (1) is strict non-identity, governed by (T1), but it holds between *two* different (primary) *individual senses*, each functioning as the meaning of

one of the two preceding terms. Thus, Frege manages brilliantly to adhere to all six premises, with certain restrictions. For instance, Frege maintains premise (T2), which seems essential to connect world and mind, but in modified form, as expressing a property of senses, not of referents.

Frege's solution lies within the category of *individuals*, but preserves—or so it seems—the other categories. There is, however, a problem about predication, i.e., what it is to have properties: Do senses have properties in the same way, or sense, in which referents do? On the other hand, Frege proposes a *dual semantic connection* between a singular term and its referent (if any) and its sense. Likewise, senses become intermediaries between referents and the mind that thinks of them.

One consequence of Frege's solution is that the following becomes false:

(SH*)   *Thesis of Semantic Homogeneity of Singular Terms:* A singular term *t* has, or may have, exactly the same meaning and referent in both direct-speech and indirect-speech constructions.

For instance, according to (SH*) the terms 'Oedipus's father' and 'the previous King of Thebes' have exactly the same meaning and referent in both premises (1) and (2). This is ruled out by Frege's solution. Shall we say that this automatically shows that Frege's solution is in error? *Not by my lights.* Yet I like (SH*) and am anxious to see *comprehensive* theories that incorporate (SH*). Of course, such theories have to give up Frege's sense/referent duality. Nevertheless, another duality has to be introduced in order to be able to account for the paradoxical tension between worldly sameness and epistemic sameness. This much is clear.

There is a long history—of which Bertrand Russell is simply the latest, most brilliant, and most thorough representative—that conflates identity, sameness, existence, and predication. An early stage of that history was developed around the old medieval slogan that only existents have properties. This slogan conflates existence with having properties. Since identity is a property that everything (that exists) has, the blending of existence with identity and with having properties is a natural projection base for many theories. Thus, the attempts to distinguish between identity and sameness, and between these and predication are (still) not fashionable.

Guise Theory started precisely as the view that, since the paradoxical core of the "paradox" is the tension between the worldly sameness proclaimed by premise (2) and the epistemic difference proclaimed by premise (1), the simplest (though nonfashionable) solution to the "paradox" is recognition that there we must reckon with a sameness that differs from (strict) identity. This solution lies, not at the level of the category of individuals, or even at the category of properties, but at the level of *predication*. The individuals are kept the same, and they have to be those that can be different. Individuation and (strict) identity go hand in hand. Thus, Oedipus's father and the previous King of Thebes are different individuals. These are the individuals denoted by the singular individuals. These are the individuals denoted by the singular terms 'Oedipus's father' and 'the previous King of Thebes,' whether these occur in direct-speech sentences or in indirect-speech constructions, thus conforming to (SH*). Such individuals, called *individual guises*, are not intermediaries between the thinking mind and the world: they *are* the only referents of the singular terms. They are thinkable individuals. This requires that the world be composed of systems of guises formed through the linkage of guises by the special relation of worldly sameness of premise (2). This sameness turns out to be in Guise Theory a special form of predication called *consubstantiation*. Since Guise Theory is non-fashionable in distinguishing between identity, existence, individuality, and predication, it can easily apply to a comprehensive treatment of fiction and literary language in unison with the language we use to describe perceptual experiences and our beliefs about existents. For this it postulates other forms of predication, which are called consociation, transubstantiation, conflation, and internal predication. Individual guises do not have to exist. One interesting thesis is that persons are consubstantiations of psychological and physical guises. Hence a mind is contingently identical with the body in a way very much the same in which the morning star is the same as the evening star.

One feature of Guise Theory is the vanishment of Frege's (primary) referents from singular reference. All singular reference is to individual guises, like Oedipus's father, the previous King of Thebes, Jocasta's second husband, etc. Because of their infinite nature, Frege's (primary) referents appear as undetermined referents of *general* reference through quantifiers. In this respect individual guises, which are ontically a good deal like Frege's individual

senses, do serve as intermediaries between the mind and Frege's primary referents. But the mediation is neither semantic nor psychological: it is *purely doxastic*.

The preceding sketches of Frege's Sense/Referent Theory and Guise Theory are very slim. But their contrasts and their common base are important foil for the ensuing discussion of philosophical method. For each of the theories, the reader can go to the relevant literature.[3] The crucial point at this juncture is that in the preceding discussion we have shunned comparative value judgments. We are not here promoting Guise Theory against Frege's Sense/Referent View, nor are we suggesting that the latter is a better view. Both are treated here as *complementary* views of the same reality of reference. In the model of Wittgenstein's remarks, one presents that reality as a "rabbit," the other as a "duck." It is nice and educational to be able to see that reality in two ways, as well as in other ways.

8. Deduction in Philosophy

An immediate consequence of the preceding discussion is that all those philosophers who ask that a theory be the endpoint of a deductive argument are out of order. The same applies to the historical work in which a writer is considering the proofs for their theories that philosphers were supposed to have furnished. It may be the case, e.g., that Descartes thought he had a proof for this or that; but we know better and see that his philosophical hypotheses do not need deductive support: they may, or may not be supported, by the facts of experience, which those hypotheses should illuminate.

Deductions take place in the exegesis of data and in the development of a theory. For instance, the exegesis of the above datum pertaining to the "paradox of reference" involved the deduction that yielded the contradiction. Nothing less than a full deduction can serve the purpose. But the move from the datum, the contradiction, to a theory, whatever theory, is *not* deductive. The theory results from a hypothesizing leap, and the theory is good, or not, if it solves the original contradiction *and* can be extended to a larger theory solving other contradictions, and provides a rearrangement of data that shows a cohesive way of looking at things.

9. How Can a Philosophical Theory Be Refuted?

So, how can one refute a theory? If deductions are not required to connect the theory with the data, how can it be refuted?

This is the exciting question. The answer is that perhaps no theory can be refuted, except within the network of assumptions within its own approach. Obviously, a refutation will have to have its premises. Equally obviously, the one who defends a theory through thick and thin can always find in those refutations at least one premise that he can reject. The argument in support of this premise need not help, because it will only show that another premise will have to be rejected. Indeed, a dispute of this sort is most useful to the defender of a theory: through it he/she can find out all the premises his opponent holds and he/she rejects. Philosophical dispute is inherently perennial. Why? Because we are dealing with the most pervasive and general features of the world, and we can always modify our hypotheses in the light of other experiences and cases.

Clearly, then, it is not only a descriptive truth about actual philosophical practice that, as some philosophers have observed, the *modus ponens* of one philosopher is the *modus tollens* of another. This is exactly as it *should* be, if we are ever going to have the many different alternative views—catering to the same data—that we urgently need. I am jettisoning the belief that for the construction of a theory a crushing refutation of alternatives is required. The effort at refutation does, however, sustain morally the constructive work. One often feels that what one is doing is worth doing only if it is the only thing to stand. If only one hypothesis or theory is to be correct, then one feels that one must destroy the existing hypotheses to have the courage to erect a new one. Thus, while the ludic and esthetic sense is not deeply imbued in the philosophical profession, refutation is good for the philosopher's morale.

Philosophical theories, at least the comprehensive ones, cannot be refuted. Thus, a more constructive endeavor should be interchanged for the prevailing polemical zeal. In any case, many of the refutational techniques in standard practice leave much to be desired. This I proceed to show by subjecting some valuable examples to exegesis.

10. Ockham's Razor and the Charge of Complexity

Simplicity is of little importance. Simplicity has to do with our abilities to understand and to do things, or with the time available to do certain things. We prefer simpler theories, not because they are truer, but because we can understand and apply them more easily. For this reason working within *one* approach or program, when we come to a fork in theory development, we should (perhaps) choose the simpler alternative—provided that the rest of the theory already built up remains constant and there is no diminution in the data the theory caters to. Even so the judgment of simplicity is ephemeral and may have to be revised when new data become available.

An often forgotten truth: judgments of simplicity are complex. They are comparative, involving *two theories and exactly the same data base.*

All that is very simple, trivial, and agreed upon by every philosopher. That is so at least when we discuss method in general. However, when we are philosophizing things are not so clear. Sometimes an author simply attacks a theory on the ground that it is too complex, without mentioning the alternative that is supposed to be simpler. Of course, rarely authors investigate whether the theories they claim to be too complex deal with exactly the same data as the alternatives they may have in mind.

Sometimes an author simply argues that *a* theory violates Ockham's Razor—just by itself! He says nothing else. Now, Ockham's Razor is this: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. Clearly, theories that violate Ockham's razor are, ontologically, too complex. Patently the claim that a theory, or author, violates Ockham's Razor *cannot* be grounded on just the major premise that is Ockham's Razor itself. The major premise may be assumed to be accepted by everybody, including the theorist under attack. The issue, when the charge of a violation of Ockham's Razor is hurled, *is* precisely the minor premise: Does the theory under consideration posit more entities than the ones demanded by the data? Palpably, the minor premise requires a comparison of *two* theories, and the same collection of data, not just the comparison between a collection of data and one theory. Yet the crucial, simpler theory needed to justify the claim is seldom, if ever, brought in for comparison.

Everybody agrees, of course, on the need to adduce a comparison of theories when the claim is made that Ockham's Razor is violated. But here again we must look at what philosophers do, not at what they say. Let us consider one simple, subtle, and intriguing example, which relates directly to the central topic of this paper.

Let us take advantage of our discussion of Guise Theory above. As remarked, the theory provides an ontological account of fiction. This is explained in my "Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections," which also contains a large collection of relevant data and discusses some alternative theories of fiction and fictional entities. Now, in an appendix to a brilliant study on both theories about and problems of fictional discourse, Robert Howell has attacked my subtheory of fiction.[4] His main argument relevant to our methodological discussion is as follows:

> Castaneda's treatment is embedded in a complex metaphysical system. Both that treatment and this general system appear to require accepting the idea that a distinct individual or object corresponds to each distinct set of (monadic) properties. As I noted in discussing Parsons in Section 1, I find this idea—which seems to multiply individuals beyond necessity—very difficult to grant. (*Op. cit.*, 175.)

This is a rich and very instructive text, deserving of careful scrutiny. We cannot do full justice to it here and must limit ourselves to the following methodological observations.

First, Howell's remark that the theory he is discussing, let us call it the *G-CCC theory* (short for the theory of Guises, Consubstantiation, Consociation, and Conflation) "seems to multiply individuals beyond necessity" is most casual. He does not offer even the slightest hint as to why the G-CCC theory introduces one more individual than is required by the problems of fictional objects that Howell has posed in his essay—let alone the other problems that he does not consider. Yet this minor premise, to the effect that the G-CCC theory postulates *some* individual that is not needed, is both a crucial issue in the assessment of the theory and a matter of great moment in our understanding of the ontological structure of our experience of fiction.

Second, Howell's suggestion that the theory introduces too many objects is an absolute complaint. Presumably he has in mind his own theory as the other member of the comparison. But, *third,* if this is so, then it is of the utmost urgency to establish that the two theories cater to *exactly* the same collection of data. Yet Howell

offers no indication that any comparison of the data at the bases of the theories being compared is even relevant to the judgment as to which one is the simpler one in its ontological commitment to individuals.

Fourth, the whole passage of Howell's just quoted contains a very interested *internal* tension. Howell records the fact that "Castaneda's treatment [of fictional objects] is embedded in a complex general metaphysical system." This strongly suggest that the total system, *i.e.*, the G-CCC theory, has been designed with some data in view *other* than the data pertaining to fictional objects. This is precisely the case in the study that Howell cites. Then G-CCC is an extension of my treatment, call it *T,* of fictional objects, and the data base *D* for *T* is a proper subset of the data base *D'* for G-CCC. *Suppose* that Howell's theory of fictional objects, call it *T',* caters to exactly the same data *D* to which my treatment *T* of fictional objects caters. *Suppose* further that Howell has established conclusively that his theory of fiction *T'* is simpler than my treatment *T* for the same data *D.* These are heavy suppositions. Nevertheless, it is still open that the G-CCC theory may be simpler than any extension *E(T')* of Howell's theory *T'* of fictional objects catering to the total collection of data *D'.* This is the internal tension in Howell's objection: even *if* he had a way of establishing that his theory of fiction is ontologically simpler than my theory of fiction for the same relevant collection of data *D,* the recognition in his very own claim that my theory of fiction is embedded in a more comprehensive theory, for which he has no comparable theory to offer, undermines the claim that my theory of fiction is ontologically more complex than his, that my theory introduces too many individuals.

Comparisons of theories with respect to simplicity, ontological, formal, or whatever, must be explicit. Even then they are very difficult to establish. Perhaps they can be fruitfully made only when we have reached the most comprehensive theories.

Fifth, let us examine what Howell says about Parsons. Howell's full relevant remark is as follows:

> [A]t least four troubling difficulties beset Parson's quasi-actualist treatment of fiction. First—a point that will presumably not move Meinongians themselves—it is *very* hard to believe that a distinct, genuine, and well-individuated object is correlated with every distinct set of properties. Yet without this belief, Parsons' treatment loses all its plausibility. Second, . . . (*Op. cit.,* 133. Original italics.)

Here is a judgment about what entities to recognize in the world for which no grounds or reasons are suggested. Notwithstanding, it would be rash to conclude that there are no data at the basis of the judgment. The data consist of some beliefs about ordinary objects like tables, minerals, plants, animals, and planets. What we have here is something like the Coffee-Pot Approach. (See Section 13 below.) The data are pretty much of the same kind, are left implicit, and no other data are collected—much less exegicized. Few scientists would nowadays dare say that it is very hard to believe that there are individuals of such and such a sort without examining the data for which the theories positing such individuals are built. Consider, e.g., the physical claim, unheard of until this century, that some particles have momentum but no position. The same methodology applies in ontology and in metaphysics. One must be prepared to find unsuspected and surprising entities if one is bent on understanding the general structures of reality and experience. Here again we find the unity of the world, which demands the unity of science and philosophy, both in topics and in methods.

I conclude that appeals to Ockham's razor are often incoherent references to the major premise of an argument, with the crucial minor premise left out of consideration; sometimes they are pseudocomparative judgments with a self-destructive internal tension. In short, they can never substitute for a direct comparison of two theories catering to the very *same* collection of data. The *not* catering to the very same data, by not being attended to in the appeals to Ockham's razor, is often the undoing of such appeals.

11. Deduction and the Refutational Policy of Divide-and-Conquer

As we have recorded, the connection between the data for the illumination or elucidation of which a theory is designed is not deductive. Yet a policy of asking for the reasons for a theory can easily arm itself with the implicit weapon that the connection must be deductive. Indeed, the idea that each of the reasons given in support of a view must provide full support for the view is tantamount to a deductive view of the connection between the reasons and the view. Let us discuss a very subtle and powerful example.

In my views on practical reason, a central place is occupied by the thesis that intending and believing differ *both qua* psychological

reality (as networks of different dispositions and propensities) *and* intensionally by having different accusatives. What is intended (which, following Sellars, I often called an *intention*) is different from what is believed (which, following traditional terminology, I frequently call a *proposition*). I have argued at length for this distinction in accusatives, and I have gathered large sets of nearly independent pieces of data. Yet I do not claim that the thesis is deductively proved. My claim is that this thesis, together with other theses about ought-judgments, imperatives, rules, etc., yields a comprehensive and well-knit system of theories.[5]

In an excellent critical study of my *Thinking and Doing*, Roderick Chisholm has attacked that double-accusative theory, and offered the attack as a partial support for a simpler, one-accusative view of his own.[6] This study is important, among other things, because it contains Chisholm's first statement of his view that the fundamental accusatives of believing and of intending are attributes (properties). This intriguing view for the case of believing he has expounded more fully in his masterful treatise *The First Person.*[7] With respect to the methodological issue we are considering, Chisholm's attack on my double-accusative is an example of the refutational policy of Divide-and-Conquer. Here is the beginning of the refutation:

> Castaneda . . . offers a *great variety of reasons and it is not possible to do justice to them all.* In what follows, I will consider *some* of the reasons that he offers—the ones that seem to me most important. I shall restrict myself to the contrast between believing and intending, and will suggest how the traditional conception of these intentional phenomena *might be defended* in view of the considerations Castaneda brings forward. (*Op. cit.*, 388; Chisholm's italics in 'some'; the rest are mine.)

This passage might on a first reading be taken to commit three perplexing operations. *First*, it might be thought to suggest that showing how each of the reasons fails to refute the traditional view suffices to show that the alternative view is mistaken. This is the technique of dividing the force of the reasons for a theory *T*. *Second*, if 'refute' is taking as *logically implies the negation of*, which is how Chisholm *seems* to take it in his following discussion, then the passage contains the claim that the data should imply the falsehood of theory $\sim T$, the contradictory of the alternative theory *T*. *Third*, if this failure of the data to imply the falsehood

of $\sim T$ is taken to support $\sim T$, then there is the claim that it is not required that theory $\sim T$, be implied by the data, even though this was demanded for theory T. But aside from dividing the reasons I offer for my theory, Chisholm *cannot* be accused of the other two moves. Indeed, he is very careful in the end to compare his theory as a whole with my theory as a whole and claim that his is *simpler* than mine for the same data. This is a perfectly legitimate move and puts the issue where it should be, namely, at the factual question whether the two theories cater to exactly the same data and whether, assuming both to be consistent, one is really simpler than the other. In any case, *the two* theories should be developed to the hilt; perhaps they can provide materials for a dia-philosophical investigation.[8]

Chisholm does divide my reasons. In the preceding quotation he says that he will select some of my many reasons, and he examines each of the four reasons he selects individually, atomistically. He continues:

> One reason for thinking that intendings have objects of a special sort, according to Castaneda, is the fact that this supposition accounts for certain "non-commutative disjunctions". . . . Certainly the distinction is of basic importance to the theory of intending. But does it *require* us, as Castaneda thinks it does, to appeal to complex relations between different types of intentional objects? There are at least two other possibilities. . . . (*Op. cit.*, p. 388. My italics.)

Chisholm concludes the first segment of criticisms:

> So far, then, we do not seem to *have any reason* for going beyond the ontology of individuals, properties, and propositions. (*Op. cit.*, p. 389; my italics.)

Chisholm writes as if each reason had to be logically sufficient for the theoretical thesis. This proedure does not conform to my view that the data do *not* imply the posited tenets of the theory. In fact, when I assessed the very first reason Chisholm considers, I discussed two alternative theories, which I called *local theories* because they are equally good alternatives for the data; but, I said, we must consider a larger collection of data. I wrote:

> An isolated consideration of intentions (1)–(3) is, of course, capable of suggesting different local views. One such view is . . . we will not argue here that such a theory looks too complicated. On the contrary, we urge anybody interested in developing the suggestion

to do so. The *more theories* there are, the better our understanding of the structure and the functions of practical thinking will be. We must emphasize, however, that the local suggestion about unless-disjunction is worthless, unless both it grows into a theory and, by taking into account all of the relevant data (A)–(L), it grows into a *comprehensive* theory. (*Thinking and Doing*, p. 161f; italics added now.)

Chisholm examines the second and third reasons in the same way. The fourth reason, he claims, is closely connected with my theory and is not independent.

Chisholm recognizes that our philosophical methodologies are in part different:

> We have considered particular arguments for the thesis that the objects of intending are proposition-like entities which are not themselves propositions, and I have suggested that *the arguments are not conclusive*. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the thesis is a very comprehensive theory which explains a vast amount of data. The author is convinced that the body of data must be considered cumulatively, and he is inclined, therefore, to reply to particular criticisms of particular arguments with a version of the thesis that the truth is the whole. (*Op. cit.*, p. 390. My italics.)

I hope that the initial discussion of method has made clear the sense in which the truth of a philosophical theory is the whole of the theory together with the criteria of adequacy established by the exegesis of the relevant data. Certainly we must stress the holistic way of treating the reasons, all of the reasons, in their support of a theory.

Chisholm remarks in connection with my fourth reason for my proposition-practition theory that "the proper response is to contrast the general system with one or more of its alternatives" (*Ibid.*, p. 390). Then he proceeds to sketch a most fascinating theory of the contents of belief and intending. It deserves careful development and scrutiny.

It is worth observing that the policy of Divide-and-Conquer can be overdone. Suppose that Carl claims that P is true and he offers *two* reasons: (1) if Q, then P; and (2) Q. Clearly, one can truly say: Carl's first reason does not imply P, and Carl's second reason does not imply P. But it would be excessive to conclude that Carl has given no reason for P. Clearly, a set of nonreasons for P, in the sense that no member of the set implies P, may itself be a powerful reason for P. Obviously, then, the deductive rela-

tionship between reasons and conclusion is also holistic. There is, therefore, no reason at all for dividing the reasons for a theory and expecting each reason by itself to establish the theory. The reasons must be taken all together, not even in subsets of principal reasons.

The Divide-and-Conquer refutational tactic can also be used to divide the theses of a view and refute them individually, say, as each being too broad, without taking the whole restrictive impact of the theses taken together.

12. The Constructive Embedding-Plea of Counterexamples

Since the Greeks invented philosophy in the West, counterexamples have been central to philosophical activity. In the analytic tradition of philosophy written in English counterexampling is more than three-quarters—or so it seems—of what is published. In some fields, for instance basic epistemology, concerned with "the analysis of 'knows,'" counterexamples probably constitute 95 percent of 'knows,'" counterexampling, though we all do it in varying the product. Counterexampling, though we all do it in varying degrees, is practiced by some colleagues as a special, highly revered art. This emphasis on counterexampling is, perhaps, the most distinctive technical contrast between so-called analytic philosophy and other, especially Continental and Asian, philosophies. To many a nonanalytic philosopher, the passion for counterexamples, and for deduction in general, seems like an Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American perversity. Here I want neither to support nor to dispute this point. I simply want to engage in a preliminary discussion of the role of counterexamples in genuine, fruitful philosophizing.

As the technique of counterexampling is practiced, a counterexample is assumed to have the substance of a minor premise in a refuting deduction. Some philosopher has propounded a view of the form: "ALL cases of A are cases of B," and the counterexampling critic describes a case of an A that is not a B. All exampling critic describes a case of an A that is not a B. All seems straight-forward. (Of course, some proposed counterexamples miss their targets, because often they are not A-cases, and sometimes miss their targets, because often they are not A-cases, and sometimes they turn out on close inspection to be B-cases as well.) Yet things are *seldom* so clear as that. For one thing, in typical analytic activities what is being analyzed is an ordinary concept, the meaning of an ordinary word, e.g., 'ought,' 'good,' 'knows,' and 'did something intentionally.' Given the vagueness, vagaries, and ambiguities of

ordinary-language expressions, there are no sharp boundaries containing the correct uses of words. Thus, the seesaw of counterexample and revised analysis can go on and on in an asymptotic process, every step of which refines and deepens our appreciation of the border between correct and incorrect application. Here is a juncture at which philosophy can perennially grow.

Counter-examples often do no clinch the refutation they aim at. The data to which a theory caters might not be precisely demarcated. Thus, it is not always clear whether the counterexample lies outside the data or not. But here the counterexample plays the role, *not* so much of refuting a theory, but of *pressing* the theory for clarification and development. This is precisely the *main* function of counterexamples: *to present cases for a theory to be embedded into a more comprehensive one.* This is, as it could have been expected, an instance of the general methodological principle, insisted upon above, that all the philosophers working at a given time are members of the same team—whether they acknowledge it or not. Whether a counterexampling philosopher is set on refuting a theory or not is not important, nor is the refutation of the particular formulation of the theory. The theory can always be extended, with revisions, to cover the new data contained in the counterexample. This contribution of data is the *value of the counterexample.* And, on the pluralistic methodology being advocated here, the theory being counterexampled *should* be revised and developed further, not thrown away or forgotten. No philosophical approach should be left undeveloped.

For concretion let us exegecize a very subtle counterexample surrounded with a very ingenious discussion in Steven E. Böer and William G. Lycan's brilliant, fruitful, and powerful essay "Who, Me?"[9] This continues the topic of singular reference with which we started our discussion of method.

I have argued in a battery of papers that the first-person pronoun used indexically is not reducible to other mechanisms of reference, and have argued that expressions used to *depict* indexical attributions to others, which I call *quasi-indicators,* are not strictly reducible to nonquasi-indicators. A consequence of those claims is this: sentences with an indexical first-person pronoun express different propositions, different truths, or falsehoods, from those expressed by sentences with third-person expressions. This goes hand in hand with the thesis that the truth (or falsehood) expressed

by the subordinate clause 'he himself is in danger' in (1) below is different from the truth (or falsehood) expressed by any other subordinate clause in which the pronoun 'he himself' is replaced with a coreferring term, as in (2):

(1)   John believes that he himself is in danger.
(2)   John believes that John is in danger.

Now, Böer and Lycan have an argument against my *Irreducibility Thesis*. But the argument is based on a premise they call A, which they acknowledge I reject in the way they interpret it. Clearly, any they acknowledge I reject in the way they interpret it. Clearly, any other *general* argument is bound to have some premise I must other *general* argument is bound to have some premise I must reject. Thus, the demonstrative proof of the error of the irreducibility thesis is not forthcoming—unless a defender of it is prepared to give it np rather than one of the premises of the alledged proof. I am not. But I welcome proposed proofs, because they help me clear up what other negative commitments I have implicitly made.

Böer and Lycan understand the situation very well. Yet they adopt a somewhat excessively polemical (or refutational) attitude after an insightful discussion of underlying issues, when they say:

> We conclude that our view is *not refuted* by Castaneda's argument alone (provided that A and B are also acceptable). (*Op. cit.*, 441; my italics.)

My argument for the Irreducibility Thesis has its own assumptions within my approach. The argument is internal, and *cannot* refute other approaches. I have already noted that I reject assumption A they adopt. We have no refutations across the theories. I am particularly anxious to see their theory developed fully, all the way to all the data for which Guise Theory has been propounded. That *larger theory* is the one I want to compare with Guise Theory (which includes all my views about indexical properties and in-dexical and quasi-indexical reference). But even then no argument internal to Guise Theory can refute Böer and Lycan's comprehensive theory.

So far, then, Böer and Lycan see themselves as preparing the terrain for the road to their theory. This is a most reasonable attitude, which I used to hold—before the fact that approaches proceed to offer an important datum, which they claim turns the

tables in their favor. As they see it, that datum clashes with the Irreducibility Thesis; hence they see themselves as breaking up the opposition and as paving the road to their view with the resulting pieces. The datum is a counterexample:

> Now, we may also add positive strength to our case by calling attention to a type of situation different from Castaneda's paradigm. in which intuitions run squarely *against* the Irreducibility Thesis. Here is an example: Perry Mason has just been approached by a murder suspect, Larson E. Whipsnade. . . . The following dialogue ensues.
> *Mason:* Here are the police now. They will arrest you and ask a lot of questions.
> *Whipsnade:* Oh, God!
> *Mason:* Tell them that I am your lawyer. And refuse to answer any questions prior to the hearing.
> (*Police enter*)
> *Lt. Tragg:* Good morning, counsellor.
> (*Turning.*) You're under arrest, Whipsnade!
> *Whipsnade (to Tragg):* Mr. Mason here is my lawyer. And I won't answer any questions until the hearing.
> Mason has issued the order:
> (15) Tell them [the police] that I am your lawyer.
> Let us legalistically suppose that 'Tell *X* that *P*' here means 'Say to *X* a sentence which expresses precisely the proposition that *P*.' Now, in his declaration to Tragg, Whipsnade has told the police that Mason (that very person, etc.) is his lawyer. Thus Whipsnade has obeyed the *unuttered* command:
> (16) Tell the police that Mason (here) is your lawyer.
> But if the Irreducibility Thesis is correct, (16) is not equivalent to (15) as uttered by Mason, since Mason "May not know that he himself is Mason," and so on. And, according to Castaneda's view, Whipsnade has not obeyed (15), since the proposition expressed by the first sentence he uttered to Tragg is not the same proposition as that (if any) expressed by (15)'s complement. . . . But *this is absurd: surely* Whipsnade can obey and *has* obeyed Mason's order. in as *strict* a sense of 'obey' as any non-partisan might care to invoke. So much the worse for the Irreducibility Thesis. (*Op. cit.*, pp. 441f; my italics in 'unuttered,' 'strict,' and 'surely.' The others are Böer and Lycan's.)

Evidently the strong language at the end does not add anything to the force of the counterexample. The point is simply this:

B-L's Datum.

(a)   There is in ordinary language good usage of the relevant words to say that when Whipsnade tells Tragg:

(15c)   Mr. Mason here is my lawyer.
        Whipsnade is *obeying* Mason's command (15).

(b)   Furthermore, there is a use of the words 'what—is what . . .' according to which it is correct to say that in such a case, *what* Whipsnade told Tragg *is what* Mason told him to tell Tragg.

(c)   *Some persons*—and after checking with native speakers, I have found some who resist the use of the word 'same'—would go on to say:

(15.s) What Whipsnade told Tragg is the *same* as what Mason told him to tell Tragg.

This datum *must* be taken seriously by any theory of reference. I concede this immediately. Obviously, the nuclear force of *B-L's datum* lies in (c). It is the use of the word 'same' that provides them with the sense of crushing victory. Yet I think we should take things slowly, with full equanimity. Here I want to make some methodological counterpoints, setting the substantive issue aside.

First, after Wittgenstein we should be wary of taking the ordinary occurrences of the word 'same' as semantically crystal-clear. Recall Wittgenstein's remark: "When it is 5 o'clock on the earth it is the same time on the sun."

Second, as the initial "Paradox of Reference" was supposed to illustrate above, whenever we have a conceptual tension we can always put it as a *tension between a sameness and a difference*. Recall how Frege's Sense/Reference Theory catered to the difference involved by postulating different senses. The novelty of Guise Theory is to take the sameness and the difference in tension at face value and enthrone them as theoretical kingpins. The Böer-Lycan counterexample is a typical conceptual puzzle: on the one hand, we have the sameness postulated by B-L(c); on the other hand, we have the difference in commands they themselves carefully note: Mason quite definitely uttered command (15), but, as they say, left command (16) unuttered. Well, by Leibniz's law there is a difference between the two commands, so they are distinct, different. We have, therefore, a philosophical puzzle: the tension

between a sameness and a difference. Obviously, the puzzle by itself cannot refute *any* theory. Hence, the Irreducibility Thesis is *not* worse off because of this puzzle.

Third, the Irreducibility Thesis *for them* is worse-off after their counterexample only because of the assumptions they make about it. They want to press the sameness we find, and some persons assert in ordinary language. Yet the example of its own force exerts no pressure one way or the other.

Fourth. Böer and Lycan are among the most brilliant philosophers now avidly writing, and in spite of the emotive language at the end of the preceding quotation, they can see that the counterexample leaves things as they are—that what we have is our *underlying* clash of presuppositions, but it is open which ones should be given up. They declare:

> [A] So far as we can see, the only option available to the Irreducibility Theorist is to deny that Whipsnade has literally obeyed Mason's order and to swallow the consequence that the order cannot be obeyed, but only somehow approximated. In effect, [B] this latter claim is just a special case of what the Irreducibility Thesis asserts; [C] so perhaps our Perry Mason argument begs the question against Castaneda in an *extended sense* of that term. But [D] we take the argument to show that the Irreducibility Thesis' plausible consequences for Castaneda's amnesiac cases and mirror cases are offset as least to some degree by its *crassly implausible* consequences for othe cases. (*Op. cit.,* m.p. 443; my italics; the bracketed labeling of the main claims is also my own.)

These four claims are very interesting. Let me comment briefly on each one. Claim [A] is true, if we take it at face value, namely, as an autobiographical statement. Obviously, everything depends on what 'same' in B-L(c) means. As noted above, Böer and Lycan have found a "paradox" as significant as the one that led Frege to his Sense/Referent View. Hence, the Irreducibility Theorist has an open field as to what to do with this new paradox. I will say something about it below. Claim [B] is true, or not, depending on the interpretation of the words 'same' and 'literally.' Claim [C] is correct; although it is also correct in a nonextended sense of 'begs the question.' Of course, Böer and Lycan postulate an extended sense of the expression because they think that there is a special force of the example, over and above the denial of the claim of sameness of the order (15) and (16), which the Irreducibility Theories—they think—cannot annihilate. This point is made em-

phatically in [D]. Palpably, the emphasis and the strong words 'crassly implausible' do not contribute anything to the force of the example. The implausibility is no more crass than the assumptions underlying the interpretation of the example. Let us turn to a discussion of the example, in order to bring out its true significance.

Fifth, we need a little theory that resolves the tension between the sameness established by B-L (c) and the difference between the two commands (15) and (16), the former being uttered, the latter remaining unuttered. Undoubtedly, *one* theory is to take the sameness to be that of one proposition—in the way in which Frege postulated one referent for the expressions 'Oedipus's father' and 'the previous King of Thebes'—and then postulate some other difference between commands (15) and (16). *I* have no objection to such a theory. Indeed, I urge the interested parties to develop it; I want to insist, however, that this is too small a theory to worry about it by itself. We must consider comprehensive theories that embed it and compare them in richness of data catered to with Guise Theory.

Another approach is to use the word 'proposition' in the traditional sense as referring to the accusatives of mental episodes, the truths, or falsehoods, that appear in person to a thinker, as the ones he can represent with his conceptual resources. In this sense, clearly the fact that command (15) was uttered, but (16) wasn't, and the additional facts about Mason perhaps not knowing that he is Mason, being utterly surprised when Whipsnade says to Tragg: "Mr. Mason, here is my lawyer," reveal that we are confronting here the very representational resources at Mason's disposal. But—I repeat—this is a convention as to how to use the word 'proposition.' What counts is to have views that resolve the tension between the sameness and the difference Böer and Lycan have pointed out.

Let us use the word 'proposition' in the preceding sense. Then we can say that just as commands (15) and (16) are different, so are the proposition Mason put forward to Whipsnade by saying "I am your lawyer" and the one Whipsnade presented to Tragg by saying "Mr. Mason here is my lawyer." Then we have a problem: how do we explain the sameness postulated by datum B-L (c)? To resolve this problem let us return to the concept of sameness, and investigate our uses of the word 'same' in other contexts in order to gain a useful perspective to judge B-L (c).

Sixth, here are some useful cases.

(a) John is standing on a chair looking through an upper window, whereas Mary is scrubbing the floor and sometimes looks through a lower window under the one John looks through. A man passes by. John sees a head; Mary sees a pair of shoes and the end of a pair of legs. Yet they see the *same man*. Do they see the same *thing?* Yes, of course: they saw the same man; No, indeed, one saw a head, the other legs.

(b) Christopher and Martin were pushing the *same car;* but one was pushing the right side of the back bumper, the other was pushing the left side. Were they pushing the same thing?

(c) Paul and Charlotte kicked Anthony, the same Anthony, she on his buttocks, he on his shoulders. Was what one kicked the same as what the other kicked?

(d) Mr. Brown pays a debt to the Whites by paying the money to Mrs. White; and Mrs. Black pays a similar debt to the Whites by paying Mr. White. Did they pay the same payee?

To sum up, very frequently X does some action A to an entity Y by doing A to a part of Y, to a representative of Y, to a member of Y, or to some other entity having the appropriate representational relation toward Y. *Synecdoche is a fundamental form of life*, because of its tremendous pragmatic value, thanks to its encompassing information at the convergence of classes of entities.

Seventh, the question we must ask is, therefore, whether, even though commands (15) and (16) are different, there is an entity to which they are related in an intimate way, so that in a broader, typical sense of 'same' performing certain speech acts on (15) is the same as performing the same acts on (16). The answer is ready at hand: for the purposes of action in the world, as contrasted with actions as conceived either in rehearsals of belief or in rehearsals of intention, we generally do not care about intensional distinctions: co-referring expressions, although denoting different individual guises, denote the same unspecified system of guises to which they belong—in an extended sense of 'denote.' Here 'co-referring' means referring to items that are *consubstantiated*. Hence, all those propositions expressed with sentences that differ in having co-referring terms form one system of ultimate equivalent propositions: these systems constitute the targets of the messages we communicate about through the expression of one or anther proposition in the system. Saying the same message is what I have

called PROPOSITIONS or STATES OF AFFAIRS (*sic*, with capitals all through).[10]

Eighth, to say it once again, the preceding account does *not* refute Böer and Lycan's account. The main moral of the discussion is to show that counterexamples by themselves refute *nothing*. Counterexamples are *counter*examples only because certain assumptions have been taken for granted. Thus, part of the value of the proposed counterexample is to allow focusing criticism on some of those underlying assumptions.

Ninth, it is most revealing, even ironic, and of course, a crucial *additional* datum, which I will call Böer and Lycan's datum (*d*), that these authors terminate their paper with the only appropriate answer to the dialogical question in the title of their essay:

> But for now it seems to us that the most reasonable answer to the skeptical 'Who. me?' is 'Yes; *you*.' (*Op. cit.*, p. 463; my italics.)

The answer to the skeptical dialogical "Who, me?" is, of course, as they say: "Yes, you." It is *not* "Yes, Mason (Lycan, Böer, Wilfrid Sellars, Frédéric Chopin, the author of *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, or even *that* man)."[11] The representational mechanisms of what is being referred to require the second-person, which, of course, is subject to another thesis I hold: namely, the Irreducibility Thesis for indexical uses of the second-person pronoun.

Of course, in a monologue *the* answer to "Who, me?" is "Yes, *me* (I)," *not* any of the third-person answers. Thus, we have moved full circle: we are exactly where we began. But now, I believe, a bit wiser.

13. The Coffee-Pot Approach

A theorizing maneuver not uncommon in philosophical papers is the deliberate restriction to limited data. I have seen this operate with dramatic effects in the case of the nature of practical reasoning. A very comprehensive theory of practical reason which dissolves all the known "paradoxes" of deontic logic appears in *Thinking and Doing*. Some critics have objected that the theory is too complex—even that it deals with too much data! Alternative theorists have proposed to formulate theories that simply solve this or that "paradox" of deontic logic. The operation is typical of what I have dubbed *The Coffee-Pot Approach*. It is tantamount to the approach adopted by a "physicist" who argued as follows:

> For me the old caloric theory of heat is good enough. I really do not care about all those fancy phenomena that other physicists study. All I care is to know how my coffee gets hot. No need to postulate molecules in rapid motion, or whatever. The whole thing is perfectly clear and simple. The caloric fluid goes through the electric wires, then it goes through the coils of the electric burner; then it jumps to the coffee pot, and then it transfers to the water. That's all. *Simple phenomena* require *simple theories!*

Obviously, this "physicist" is right as far as he goes. His error is simply his refusal to embed his data base into larger data bases and to extend his simple theory to more comprehensive theories that must deal with *all* the phenomena of the relevant type, and then embed that theory into more comprehensive theories that deal with other kind of phenomena, and so on until we understand the unitary structure of the whole world. Our target is, of course, the whole world.

There is, therefore, *no* point at all in studying local theories when we have more comprehensive theories. The only fruitful task is to extend the theories we have to make them even more comprehensive. And that's just all there is to it.

14. Conclusion

To refute a philosophical theory is not an easy task. Yet proposed refutations must be encouraged, because they will force the development of the theories attacked. The role of counterexamples is to enrich the data base of a theory and to focus the heat on their own presuppositions. Furthermore, to ask for proof of a theory is to ask for something inappropriate. The urgent need of the times is the development of more and more encompassing theories, catering to all the relevant data already collated by different approaches.

The most illuminating and educational philosophical experience is the comparison of comprehensive and rich and very different philosophical views.

Notes

1. For a complementary defense of philosophical pluralism and a complementary discussion of method with treatment of its foundations and of several examples, see Castaneda 1980.

2. For a detailed illustration of the semantic-syntactic contrasts that constitute the separation of practical reason from contemplative (sometimes called theoretical or pure thinking), see Castaneda 1980, chs. 3 and 4. The discussion includes a critical history of meta-ethical theories.

3. In particular, for Frege, see his *Sense and Reference* of which there are several translations. For Guise Theory, see Plantinga, "Guise Theory," and Clark, "The Theory of Predication: Guised and Undisguised," together with my replies, in Tomberlin 1983).

4. Robert Howell 1979, pp. 129–77; Castaneda 1979, pp. 31–62.

5. See Castaneda 1975.

6. See Chisholm 1979, pp. 385–86.

7. See Chisholm 1981.

8. For a discussion of dia-philosophy as the comparative study of comprehensive theories in order to ascertain their isomorphisms and their shiftings of complexity (provided they cater to the same rich data base), see Castaneda 1980, chs. 1 and 3.

9. Böer and Lycan 1980, pp. 427–66.

10. See Castaneda 1977, pp. 285–351, pt. II, where there is a threefold distinction among: propositions, propositional guises, and PROPOSITIONS, which accounts for a good number of problems, including the "paradox of analysis," the enrichment of perceptual fields through attention, and logical form.

11. My Irreducibility Thesis for the First-person pronoun used indexically includes as a special case the very tempting reduction to third-person *demonstrative* reference to oneself. But an indexical 'I' is not reducible to 'This . . .' even when 'This . . .' is used by the speaker to point to himself. For a discussion of this, see Castaneda 1966, pp. 130–57.

Epilogue

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The following bibliography contains only works actually referred to in the text, apart from several additional sources on infinite regress arguments that David Sanford has included. These entries are preceded by an asterisk (*). The editor is grateful to Robert H. Knox for his valuable assistance in the completion of this project.

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