

## Introduction

- There are two main issues:
- Authentication
- Authorization
* Authentication: is validating the user and the messages sent by by the authenticated user.
- Authorization: refers to access control of resources after a user/message has been authenticated.
- Security primarily refers to the authentication issue. This is discussed quite nicely in chapter 7 of your text.
- For access control models we will discuss Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS).


## Cryptography

- Cryptography is the basis for authentication of messages.
- We need security protocols to exploit it.
- Selection of cryptographic algorithms and management of keys are critical issues for effectiveness, performance and usefulness of security mechanisms.
- Public-key cryptography is good for key distribution but inadequate for encryption of bulk data.
- Secret-key cryptography is suitable for bulk encryption tasks.
- Hybrid protocols such as SSL (Secure Socket Layer) establish a secure channel using public-key cryptography and then use it exchange secret keys for subsequent data exchanges.


## Historical context: the evolution of security needs

|  | 1965-75 | 1975-89 | 1990-99 | Current |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Platforms | Multi-user timesharing computers | Distributed systems based on local networks | The Internet, widearea services | The Internet + mobile devices |
| Shared resources | Memory, files | Local services (e.g. NFS), local network | Email, web sites, Internet commerce | Distributed objects, mobile code |
| Security requirements | User identification authentication | rrotection of service | Strong security for commercial transactions | Access control for individual objects, secure mobile code |
| Security management environment | Single authority, single authorization database (e.g. /etc/ passwd) | Single authority, delegation, replicated authorization databases (e.g. NIS) | Many authorities, no network-wide authorities | Per-activity authorities, groups with shared Responsibilities, mass authentication |

## Encryption

*Most schemes include algorithms for encrypting and decrypting messages based on secret codes called keys.

- Two common models:
- Shared secret keys
- Public/private key pairs: A message encrypted with the public key of the receiver can be decrypted only by the private key of the recipient.


## Familiar names for the protagonists in security protocols

| Alice | First participant |
| :--- | :--- |
| Bob | Second participant |
| Carol | Participant in three- and four-party protocols |
| Dave | Participant in four-party protocols |
| Eve | Eavesdropper |
| Mallory | Malicious attacker |
| Sara | A server |

## Cryptography notations

| $K_{A}$ | Alice's secret key |
| :--- | :--- |
| $K_{B}$ | Bob's secret key |
| $K_{A B}$ | Secret key shared between Alice and Bob |
| $K_{A p r i v}$ | Alice's private key (known only to Alice) |
| $K_{\text {Apub }}$ | Alice's public key (published by Alice for all to read) |
| $\{M\}_{K}$ | MessageMencrypted with key |
| $[M]_{\mathrm{K}}$ | MessageMsigned with key |

## Cryptographic Algorithms

- Plain text $\rightarrow$ cipher text $\rightarrow$ Decipher text
- $E(K, M)=\{M\}_{K}$ where $E$ is the encryption
function, M is the message and K is the key.
Decryption:
- $D(K, E(K, M))=M$
- Same key is used in encrypting and decrypting. So it is called symmetric cryptography.


## Stream cipher



## Cryptographic algorithms

- Shannon's principles of cryptography: introduce "confusion" (XORing, bit shifting etc.) and "diffusion" (adding noise bits to diffuse the information)
- We will look at Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) as an example of symmetric algorithm and Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (RSA) an an example for asymmetric algorithms.


## TEA Encryption Function

void encrypt(unsigned long k[], unsigned long text[]) \{
unsigned long $y=\operatorname{text}[0], z=\operatorname{text}[1] ;$
unsigned long delta $=0 x 9 e 3779 b 9$, sum $=0$; int $n$;
for $(n=0 ; n<32 ; n++)$ \{
sum $+=$ delta;
$y+=((z \ll 4)+k[0])^{\wedge}(z+\text { sum })^{\wedge}((z \gg 5)+k[1]) ;$ $z+=((y \ll 4)+k[2])^{\wedge}(y+\text { sum })^{\wedge}((y \gg 5)+k[3]) ;$
\}
$\operatorname{text}[0]=y ; \quad \operatorname{text}[1]=z ; \quad\}$

## TEA decryption function

```
void decrypt(unsigned long k[], unsigned long text[]) {
    unsigned long y = text[0], z=text[1];
    unsigned long delta = 0x9e3779b9, sum = delta << 5; int n;
    for ( }n=0;n<32;n++) 
        z-= ((y<<4) +k[2])^ (y+sum)^}((y>> 5)+k[3])
        y-=((z<<4)+k[0])^(z+sum)^}((z>>5)+k[1])
        sum -= delta;
    }
    text[0] = y; text[1] = z;
}
```


## TEA in use

```
@ void tea(char mode, FILE *infile, FILE *outfile, unsigned long k[]) {
    /* mode is 'e' for encrypt, 'd'for decrypt, k[] is the key. */
        char ch, Text[8]; int i;
        while(!feof(infile)) {
        i= fread(Text, 1, 8, infile); /* read 8 bytes from infile into
    Text */
        if (i<=0) break;
        while (i<8) {Text[i++] = '';} /* pad last block with spaces */
        switch (mode) {
        case 'e':
            encrypt(k, (unsigned long*) Text); break;
            case 'd':
                decrypt(k, (unsigned long*) Text); break;
            }
            fwrite(Text, 1, 8, outfile); /* write 8 bytes from Text to
        outfile */

\section*{RSA Encryption}

To find a key pair \(e, d\) :
1. Choose two large prime numbers, \(P\) and \(Q\) (each greater than 10100), and form:
\[
\begin{aligned}
& N=P \times Q \\
& Z=(P-1) \times(Q-1)
\end{aligned}
\]
2. For \(d\) choose any number that is relatively prime with \(Z\) (that is, such that \(d\) has no common factors with \(Z\) ).

We illustrate the computations involved using small integer values for \(P\) and \(Q\) :
\[
\begin{aligned}
& P=13, Q=17 \rightarrow N=221, Z=192 \\
& d=5
\end{aligned}
\]
3. \(\quad\) To find \(e\) solve the equation:
exd \(=1 \bmod Z\)
That is, exd is the smallest element divisible by \(d\) in the series \(Z+1,2 Z+1\), \(3 Z+1, \ldots\).
\(e x d=1 \bmod 192=1,193,385, \ldots\)
385 is divisible by \(d\)

\section*{RSA Encryption (contd.)}
fo encrypt text using the RSA method, the plaintext is divided into equal blocks of length \(k\) bits where \(2^{k}<N\) (that is, such that the numerical value of a block is always less than \(N\); in practical applications, \(k\) is usually in the range 512 to 1024).
\[
\mathrm{k}=7 \text {, since } 2^{7}=128
\]

The function for encrypting a single block of plaintext \(M\) is: \((\mathrm{N}=\mathrm{P} \mathrm{X} \mathrm{Q}=13 \mathrm{X17}=\) 221), \(e=77, d=5\) :
\(E^{\prime}(e, N, M)=M^{e} \bmod N\)
for a message \(M\), the ciphertext is \(M^{77} \bmod 221\)
The function for decrypting a block of encrypted text \(c\) to produce the original plaintext block is:
\(D^{\prime}(d, N, c)=c^{d} \bmod N\)
The two parameters \(e, N\) can be regarded as a key for the encryption function, and similarly \(d, N\) represent a key for the decryption function.
So we can write \(\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{e}}=<\mathrm{e}, \mathrm{N}>\) and \(\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{d}}=<\mathrm{d}, \mathrm{N}>\), and we get the encryption function: \(E\left(K_{e}, M\right)=\{M\}_{K}\) (the notation here indicating that the encrypted message can be decrypted only by the holder of the private key \(\left.K_{d}\right)\) and \(D\left(K_{d},=\{M\}_{K}\right)=M\).
<e,N> - public key, d - private key for a station

\section*{Application of RSA}

\section*{Lets say a person in Atlanta wants to send a message \(M\) to a person in Buffalo: Atlanta encrypts message using Buffalo's public key \(B \rightarrow E(M, B)\)}
- Only Buffalo can read it using it private key b: \(E(p, E(M, B)) \rightarrow M\)
* In other words for any public/private key pair determined as previously shown, the encrypting function holds two properties:
- \(E(p, E(M, P)) \rightarrow M\)
- \(E(P, E(M, P)) \rightarrow M\)

\section*{How can you authenticate "sender"?}
* (In real life you will use signatures: the concept of signatures is introduced.)
- Instead of sending just a simple message, Atlanta will send a signed message signed by Atlanta's private key:
- \(\mathrm{E}(\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{E}(\mathrm{M}, \mathrm{a}))\)
- Buffalo will first decrypt using its private key and use Atlanta's public key to decrypt the signed message:
- \(\mathrm{E}(\mathrm{b}, \mathrm{E}(\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{E}(\mathrm{M}, \mathrm{a})) \rightarrow \mathrm{E}(\mathrm{M}, \mathrm{a})\)
- \(E(A, E(M, a)) \rightarrow M\)

\section*{Digital Signatures}
- Strong digital signatures are essential requirements of a secure system. These are needed to verify that a document is:
- Authentic : source
- Not forged : not fake
- Non-repudiable : The signer cannot credibly deny that the document was signed by them.

\section*{Digest Functions}
* Are functions generated to serve a signatures. Also called secure hash functions.
- It is message dependent.
-Only the Digest is encrypted using the private key.

\section*{Alice's bank account certificate}
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
& \\
& Account number \\
1. Certificate type & Alice \\
2. Name & 6262626 \\
3. Account & Bob's Bank \\
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
4. Certifying authority \\
5. Signature & \{Digestfield 2 + field 3\()_{K_{\text {Bpriv }}}\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{Digital signatures with public keys}


Low-cost signatures with a shared secret key


\section*{X509 Certificate format}
\begin{tabular}{l|l|l|l}
\hline Subject & Distinguished Name, Public Key & & \\
\hline Issuer & Distinguished Name, Signature & & \\
\hline Period of validity & Not Before Date, Not After Date & & \\
\hline Administrativeinformation & Version, Serial Number & & \\
\hline Extended Information & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Certificates are widely used in e-commerce to authenticate Subjects.
A Certificate Authority is a trusted third party, which certifies Public Key's do truly belong to their claimed owners.
Certificate Authorities: Verisign, CREN (Corp for Educational Research Networking), Thawte
See also Netscape SSL2.0 Certificate format:
http://wp.netscape.com/eng/security/ssl 2.0 certificate.html\#SSL2cert

\section*{The Needham-Schroeder secret-key authentication protocol}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline Header & Message & Notes \\
\hline 1. A->S: & \(A, B, N_{A}\) & A requests \(S\) to supply a key for communication with B. \\
\hline 2. S->A: & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \left\{N_{A}, B, K_{A B},\right. \\
& \left.\quad\left\{K_{A B}, A\right\}_{K_{B}}\right\}_{K_{A}}
\end{aligned}
\] & S returns a message encrypted in A's secret key, containing a newly generated key \(K_{A B}\) and a 'ticket' encrypted in B's secret key. The nonce \(N_{A}\) demonstrates that the message was sent in response to the preceding one. A believes that \(S\) sent the message because only S knows A's secret key. \\
\hline 3. A->B: & \(\left\{K_{A B}, A\right\}_{K_{B}}\) & A sends the 'ticket' to B. \\
\hline 4. B->A: & \(\left\{N_{B}\right\}_{K_{A B}}\) & B decrypts the ticket and uses the new key \(K_{A B}\) to encrypt another nonce \(N_{B}\). \\
\hline 5. A->B: & \(\left\{N_{B}-1\right\}_{K_{A B}}\) & A demonstrates to \(B\) that it was the sender of the previous message by returning an agreed transformation of \(N_{B}\). \\
\hline 10/13/2004 & & B.Ramamurthy 24 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{System architecture of Kerberos}


\section*{SSL protocol stack}
SSL
Handshak
protocol SSL Change SSL Alert Cipher Spec Protocol

HTTP
Telnet

SSL Record Protocol
Transport layer (usually TCP)


SSL protocols:
Other protocols

\section*{SSL handshake protocol}


\section*{SSL handshake configuration options}
\begin{tabular}{llll} 
& & & Example \\
\hline Component & Description & & RSA with public-key \\
Certificates
\end{tabular}

\section*{SSL record protocol}


\section*{Millicent architecture}


Scrip layout
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