CS 472/572 DIRECTORY OF FILES

(Other relevant pages: Syllabus, TAs' homepage)

Note: or updated items are listed first.

1. References on the Chinese-Room Argument

2. HW #8

3. HW #7

4. Project #4

5. HW #6

6. Miscellaneous knowledge representation references -- UPDATED (1 Apr 97)

7. SNePS Readings

8. Answers to Mid-Term Exam (postscript)

9. Project #3 (postscript)

10. ``The Logic of the Ternary Sentential Connective `If-Then-Else' '' (postscript) -- UPDATED

11. HW #5

12. HW #4

13. Another cartoon about logic and semantics.

14. Readings on the Procedural-Declarative Controversy

15. Grading Principles

16. Project #2

17. Far Side cartoon

18. Buffalo Ontology Site

19. Brian Cantwell Smith's knowledge representation hypothesis

20. References on SOAR

21. Errata for Russell & Norvig text

22. HW #3

23. TAs' home page

24. HW #2

25. Sources of info on AI

26. Rapaport, William J.; Shapiro, Stuart C.; & Wiebe, Janyce M. (forthcoming, 1997), ``Quasi-Indexicals and Knowledge Reports'', Cognitive Science, Vol. 21; Technical Report 95-49 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Department of Computer Science, 1995) and Technical Report 95-17 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Center for Cognitive Science, 1995).

    Abstract: We present a computational analysis of de re, de dicto, and de se belief and knowledge reports. Our analysis solves a problem first observed by Hector-Neri Castañeda, namely, that the simple rule
    

    `(A knows that P ) implies P ' apparently does not hold if P contains a quasi-indexical. We present a single rule, in the context of a knowledge-representation and reasoning system, that holds for all P , including those containing quasi-indexicals. In so doing, we explore the difference between reasoning in a public communication language and in a knowledge-representation language, we demonstrate the importance of representing proper names explicitly, and we provide support for the necessity of considering sentences in the context of extended discourse (for example, written narrative) in order to fully capture certain features of their semantics.

27. Rapaport, William J. (1996), ``How Minds Can Be Computational Systems'', Technical Report 96-10 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Department of Computer Science, 1996) and Technical Report 96-1 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Center for Cognitive Science, 1996). Revised version of paper presented as part of an invited symposium, ``Are Minds Computational Systems?'' at the 88th Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Nashville, 5 April 1996, with other papers by James H. Fetzer and Selmer Bringsjord.

    Abstract: The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, viz., that Turing-Test-passing artifacts are persons; it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably be persons.

28. Project #1

29. Homework #1

30. Syllabus

31. Instructions for Word-Processed or Typed Papers

32. Goleman, Daniel (1997), ``Laugh and Your Computer Will Laugh With You, Someday'' New York Times (7 January 1997): C1, C9.

33. Ramirez, Anthony (1997), ``No HAL Yet: Artificial Intelligence Visions Underestimated the Mind'' New York Times (13 January 1997): D4.

34. What Is Computation?