``Any process capable of reasoning intelligently about the world must
consist in part of a field of structures, of a roughly linguistic
sort, which in some fashion represent whatever knowledge and beliefs
the process may be said to possess.''
part 2:
``There is ... an internal process that ... `computes with' these
representations.''
part 3:
``This ... process ... react[s] only to the `form' or `shape' of these
mental representations without regard to what they mean or represent.''
Version 2 (p. 33):
``Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be comprised of
structural ingredients that a) we as external observers naturally take
to represent a propositional account of the knowledge that the overall
process exhibits and b) independent of such external semantical
attribution, play a formal but causal and essential role in engendering
the behavior that manifests that knowledge.''