From owner-cse584-sp07-list@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Wed Jan 31 20:31:36 2007 Received: from ares.cse.buffalo.edu (ares.cse.Buffalo.EDU [128.205.32.79]) by castor.cse.Buffalo.EDU (8.13.6/8.12.10) with ESMTP id l111VZmN011506 for ; Wed, 31 Jan 2007 20:31:35 -0500 (EST) Received: from front3.acsu.buffalo.edu (warmfront.acsu.buffalo.edu [128.205.6.88]) by ares.cse.buffalo.edu (8.13.6/8.13.6) with SMTP id l111VScp094866 for ; Wed, 31 Jan 2007 20:31:28 -0500 (EST) Received: (qmail 27415 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2007 01:31:28 -0000 Received: from mailscan3.acsu.buffalo.edu (128.205.6.135) by front3.acsu.buffalo.edu with SMTP; 1 Feb 2007 01:31:28 -0000 Received: (qmail 27405 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2007 01:31:28 -0000 Received: from deliverance.acsu.buffalo.edu (128.205.7.57) by front3.acsu.buffalo.edu with SMTP; 1 Feb 2007 01:31:28 -0000 Received: (qmail 7516 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2007 01:31:19 -0000 Received: from listserv.buffalo.edu (128.205.7.35) by deliverance.acsu.buffalo.edu with SMTP; 1 Feb 2007 01:31:19 -0000 Received: by LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU (LISTSERV-TCP/IP release 14.5) with spool id 3044128 for CSE584-SP07-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU; Wed, 31 Jan 2007 20:31:19 -0500 Delivered-To: cse584-sp07-list@listserv.buffalo.edu Received: (qmail 13043 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2007 01:31:18 -0000 Received: from mailscan4.acsu.buffalo.edu (128.205.6.136) by listserv.buffalo.edu with SMTP; 1 Feb 2007 01:31:18 -0000 Received: (qmail 14590 invoked from network); 1 Feb 2007 01:31:18 -0000 Received: from castor.cse.buffalo.edu (128.205.32.14) by smtp3.acsu.buffalo.edu with SMTP; 1 Feb 2007 01:31:18 -0000 Received: from castor.cse.Buffalo.EDU (rapaport@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by castor.cse.Buffalo.EDU (8.13.6/8.12.10) with ESMTP id l111VHC8011503 for ; Wed, 31 Jan 2007 20:31:17 -0500 (EST) Received: (from rapaport@localhost) by castor.cse.Buffalo.EDU (8.13.6/8.12.9/Submit) id l111VHFm011502 for cse584-sp07-list@listserv.buffalo.edu; Wed, 31 Jan 2007 20:31:17 -0500 (EST) X-UB-Relay: (castor.cse.buffalo.edu) X-PM-EL-Spam-Prob: : 7% Message-ID: <200702010131.l111VHFm011502@castor.cse.Buffalo.EDU> Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2007 20:31:17 -0500 Reply-To: "William J. Rapaport" Sender: "Philosophy of Computer Science, Spring 2007" From: "William J. Rapaport" Subject: NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE To: CSE584-SP07-LIST@LISTSERV.BUFFALO.EDU Precedence: list List-Help: , List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-Owner: List-Archive: X-UB-Relay: (castor.cse.buffalo.edu) X-DCC-Buffalo.EDU-Metrics: castor.cse.Buffalo.EDU 1336; Body=0 Fuz1=0 Fuz2=0 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,SUBJ_ALL_CAPS autolearn=no version=3.1.7 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.1.7 (2006-10-05) on ares.cse.buffalo.edu X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV 0.88.6/2508/Wed Jan 31 11:42:50 2007 on ares.cse.buffalo.edu X-Virus-Status: Clean Status: R Content-Length: 2648 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Subject: NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE ------------------------------------------------------------------------ A student writes: | I know this is back tracking a little bit, but could you say some more | about Papineau's comments concerning the naturalized approach to | science. I am still unclear as to what a "naturalized epistemology" is. | The naturalized epistemology discussion begins on page 307. In the first | paragraph, he defines it as regarding itself as a subject for a | posteriori investigation. Can you say more about this? Give some | examples? How is this important? First, I must admit that I don't fully understand what Papineau is saying here, mainly because I'm not a philosopher of science, so I haven't followed this particular line of debate. I suppose you should probably read the book by Kitcher that Papineau cites if you really want to find out more. However, second, the example on p. 308 (last 2 paragraphs of the section) suggests what his point might be: If we're seeking a justification of induction (our ability to infer general or universal principles on the basis of finite evidence, or the ability to predict that the future will be like the past), then maybe instead of looking for a logical (or "a priori") justification, we should justify it on the basis of its success, i.e., justify it inductively(!) based on our experience with it: Induction has almost always been successful in the past, so let's assume that it will almost always be successful in the future. I.e., we can justify it on the basis of our experience with it ("a posteriori"). Begin digression: "A priori" literally means, in Latin, "from what comes before (from what is prior)". It usually refers to knowledge that we can have independently of (i.e., "before" having) any experience. "A posteriori" literally means, in Latin, "from what comes after (from what is posterior)". It usually refers to knowledge that we can only have on the basis of (i.e., "after" having) experience. End digression. Third, there's a possible example of the kind of naturalized epistemology that Papineau is talking about here in a recent article in the Journal of Philosophy that discusses how empirical, psychological theories of how humans understand causation might help us develop a good philosophical theory of causation. (The article is also useful for a section that nicely summarizes philosophical theories of causation.) But I'm writing from home, and my copy of that issue is at work, so you'll have to wait for the full citation :-)