CSE 719:  Computational Theories of Consciousness, Fall 2009

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Edelman (2003) quotes (for bib info, see online bibliography)
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1. p. 5521, col 1, para 2
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"To expect that a theoretical explanation of consciousness can itself
provide an observer with the experience of 'the redness of red' is to
ignore just those phenotypic properties and life history that enable an
individual animal to know what it is like to be such an animal.  A
scientific theory cannot presume to replicate the experience that it
describes or explains; a theory to account for a hurricane is not a
hurricane.  A third-person description by a theorist of the qualia
associated with wine tasting can, for exammple, take detailed account of
the reported personal experiences of that theorist and his human subjects.
It cannot, however, directly convey or induce qualia by description; to
experience the discriminations of an individual, it is necessary to be
that individual.  ...this [is an] inherent limitation imposed by
privacy." 


Searle on Edelman (Mystery of Csness 1997:41)
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"The brain has a problem to solve.  It has to develop perceptual
categories beginning with shapes, color, movement, and eventually
including objects--tree, horse, and cup--and it has to be able to
abstract general concepts.  It has to do all this in a situation where
the world is not already labeled and divided up into categories, and in
which the brain has no program in advance and no homunculus inside to
guide it."


2. p. 5523, col 2, para 1
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"A scientific view that assumes that consciousness arises from reentrant
interactions among neural populations must therefore conclude that it is
the neural activity of the dynamic core [reentrant events occurring in
the thalamocortical system] that is causal.  If we call that activity C'
and the qualia it entails C, then it is C' that is the cause of our
actions and further C' events [RECALL OUR COMMUTATIVE BRAIN/MIND CAUSAL
DIAGRAM].  Some philosophers have recoiled from this view, considering
it as simply another version of epiphenomenalism or even dualism.  There
is, however, no need to conclude that C is therefore meaningless and
unnecessary; C states are informational even if not causal.  C states are
the discriminations entailed by causal transactions among C' states. ...
The reports of a first person subject will be necessary, and necessarily
they will be in C language.  When we speak to each other, our speech is
drawn from C', as is all our activity, but it is in C terms that we
carry out our exchanges."


3. p. 5524, col 2, para 1:
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"Given the hyperastronomical functional connectivity peatterns of the
dynamic core, ... no two subjects can have identical core activity."