CSE 719: Computational Theories of Consciousness, Fall 2009 ======================================================================== Perlis (1997) quotes (for bib info, see online bibliography) ======================================================================== 1. Sect. 1, para 2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "(i)...consciousness is synonymous with self, and self with a special sort of self-modeling I call strong self-referential computation; (ii)...there is an indivisible 'something it is like to be' a strongly-self-modeling (or referring) entity, constituting a sort of ur-quale, [SO THERE IS SOMETHING IT IS LIKE TO BE ONE OF THESE THINGS, I.E., SOMETHING IT IS LIKE TO BE CONSCIOUS. & THIS IS THE BASIC KIND OF QUALE] and without which no experience, no subjectivity, is possible; [I.E., ALL OTHER QUALIA REQUIRE THIS UR-QUALE, I.E.:] & (iii) out of the ur-quale can arise fancier sorts of ineffable qualia: colors, emotions, ad so on." 2. Sect. 2, para 5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Qualia are the individuating aspects of experiences that allow us to distinguish experiences from one another...." [THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH DENNETT!] 3. Sect. 2.1, para 5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "...there is an ur-quale [that is] necessary & sufficient for consciousness [I.E., x IS CONSCIOUS IFF x EXPERIENCES THE UR-QUALE (?)] and...it is a special **but effable** sort of strongly-self-modeling computational process" [PRESUMABLY: IT'S EFFABLE *BECAUSE* IT'S COMPUTATIONAL, HENCE EXPRESSIBLE IN A PROG'G LANG] 4. Sect 2.2 -- Perlis's central argument for the ur-quale ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "...suppose an experience with quale Q to be modified so that Q is missing from the experience. [KEEP IN MIND THAT THERE HAS TO BE A SUBJECT OF THE EXPERIENCE, I.E., AN EXPERIENCER] For instance, suppose the redness of an apple-perception disappears and the apple is seen as a shade of grey. There are still qualia present in the modified experience, namely brightness and shape qualia among others. Now suppose the brightness and shape qualia absent as well; in fact suppose the experience is 'reduced' simply to that of knowing there is an apple ahead. Still qualia remain in the experience, for it is like something to experience knowing an apple is ahead, even without seeing it; and we can distinguish knowing about an apple from other experiences. What if now we remove that knowing as well, and are left with bare experience with no distinguishing features to single out: no apple, no thoughts, just bare experiential awareness, pure consciousness. [*IS* THAT WHAT WE WOULD BE LEFT WITH? OR WOULD WE BE LEFT WITH AN EXPERIENCER WHO IS NOT HAVING ANY EXPERIENCE, WHO IS WITHOUT ANY CONSCIOUSNESS? WOULD THIS EXPERIENCER BE ANY DIFFERENT FROM ANOTHER EXPERIENCER WHO STARTED WITH AN EXPERIENCE OF A FIRE ENGINE INSTEAD OF AN APPLE AND WHO HAD ALL ITS QUALIA SUCCESSIVELY REMOVED? IF THEY *ARE* DIFFERENT, THEN THE DIFFERENCE MUST LIE IN THE OBJECT OF THE EXPERIENCE, WHICH WOULDN'T BE AN UR-QUALE. IF THEY ARE NOT DIFFERENT, THEN NEITHER IS EXPERIENCING ANYTHING, BOTH ARE UNCONSCIOUS, AND THERE IS NO UR-QUALE.] ...Suppose such a state of experience is possible. [I.E., SUPPOSE WE HAVE AN EXPERIENCER WITH AN UR-QUALE] ...can it too be distinguished from other experiences? Can one imagine it removed?...Since all experience would be gone then, it would seem that it is not like anything at all for such a pure consciousness to be gone. [THIS IS MY CONCLUSION.] But if we cannot even imagine it absent, i.e., [if we cannot imagine] what it is like for that experience to be absent, this seems to fly in the face of the property of distinguishability stated as our definition of qualia. [ON MY VIEW, THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY, BECAUSE NO QUALE IS LEFT; ALL THAT'S LEFT IS THE EXPERIENCER EXPERIENCING NOTHING] ...how can an experience be like something and yet not be distinguishable from other experiences (i.e., possessed of qualia)? [I WOULD SAY THAT IN THIS CASE THERE IS NO EXPERIENCE, HENCE NOTHING TO BE DISTINGUISHABLE] ...Yet there is a way out [OF PERLIS'S DILEMMA; I HAVE NO DILEMMA]: It may be that an experience can be distinguished in and of itself, by its own intrinsic character, rather than by comparison to something else....perhaps bare consciousness is in and of itself a self-distinguishing process...that takes note of itself. If so, it could still be considered a quale, the ur-quale, what it's like to be a bare subject....[S]uch a kind of self-perceiving process may be computational. [CHARACTERIZING SOMETHING IN TERMS OF SOMETHING ELSE IS A SEMANTIC PROCESS. CHARACTERIZING SOMETHING IN TERMS OF ITSELF IS A SYNTACTIC PROCESS. IS THIS WHY HE THINKS IT MIGHT BE COMPUTATIONAL?] 5. Sect. 3, paras 1-2: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "a hypothesis...*Consciousness is the function or process that allows a system to distinguish itself from the rest of the world*, conferring a point of view on the system, hence providing Perry's essential indexical 'I'...." 6. Sect. 4, paras 9, 16, 10, & note 19 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "...a self is...an entity G that can refer to G [I.E., TO ITSELF???] as that entity doing that very referring" "consciousness [is] a process of self-referring that satisfies the[se] three axioms": "An entity G strongly-self-refers by an action A if: 1. G models the performance of A 2. that same modeling is part of that very performance of A 3. this reflexive aspect of the modeling is itself part of the modeling "Here 'modeling' is...nearly synonymous with 'referring' or 'representing'." 7. Sect. 5, para 3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "...the computational mechanism I have promised as a possible basis for the ur-quale...is strongly self-referring computation, probably facilitated by some sort of quotational syntax. However, it is a computational research paradigm, not a precisely defined notion.... need[ed]...in intelligent behavior."