

## CSE 486/586 Distributed Systems Security --- 2

Steve Ko  
Computer Sciences and Engineering  
University at Buffalo

CSE 486/586

### Recap

- Three types of functions
  - Cryptographic hash, symmetric key crypto, asymmetric key crypto
- Cryptographic hash
  - Easy to compute  $h(m)$
  - Hard to find an  $m$ , given  $h(m)$
  - Hard to find two values that hash to the same  $h(m)$
- How to find collisions?
  - Birthday paradox: for 50% prob. &  $m$  bits,  $\sim 2^{m/2}$  numbers
- Symmetric key crypto
  - MAC: Compute  $H = \text{AES}_k(\text{SHA1}(M))$  & Send  $\langle M, H \rangle$
- Asymmetric key crypto
  - Guarantees rely on computational hardness

CSE 486/586

2

### Recap

- MAC
  - Symmetric crypto
  - Verifies the authenticity of a message
  - Sender: compute  $H = \text{AES}_k(\text{SHA1}(M))$  & send  $\langle M, H \rangle$
  - Receiver: compute  $H' = \text{AES}_k(\text{SHA1}(M))$  & check  $H' == H$
- Digital Signatures
  - Asymmetric crypto
  - Signer: compute  $H = \text{RSA}_k(\text{SHA1}(M))$  & send  $\langle M, H \rangle$
  - Verifier: compute  $H' = \text{RSA}_k(H)$  & verify  $H' == \text{SHA1}(M)$
  - Not just integrity, but also authenticity

CSE 486/586

3

### Heard of Firesheep?

- Firesheep
  - A Firefox extension
  - A packet sniffer to intercept unencrypted cookies from certain websites (such as Facebook and Twitter)
  - Allows the user to take on the log-in credentials of the victim
- Solution?
  - Encrypt your traffic!
  - This is before facebook started using https, but now facebook uses https.

CSE 486/586

4


### “Securing” HTTP

- Threat model
  - Eavesdropper listening on conversation (confidentiality)
  - Man-in-the-middle modifying content (integrity)
  - Adversary impersonating desired website (authentication, and confidentiality)
- Enter HTTP-S
  - HTTP sits on top of secure channels
  - All (HTTP) bytes written to secure channel are encrypted and authenticated

CSE 486/586

5

### Encrypted Communication



- What is wrong with this?
  - How do you know you're actually talking to facebook and f-pub belongs to facebook?

CSE 486/586

6


## Digital Certificates

- A **digital certificate** is a statement signed by a third party principal, and can be reused
  - e.g., Verisign Certification Authority (CA)
- To be useful, certificates must have:
  - A standard format, for construction and interpretation
  - A protocol for constructing chains of certificates
  - A trusted authority at the end of the chain
- Example**
  - When facebook sends you the public key, it also sends a signature for the public key signed by Verisign.
  - You pre-store Verisign's public keys & certificates (self-signed by Verisign), i.e., you have already established trust with Verisign.
  - Use Verisign's public key to verify facebook's public key.

CSE 486/586

7

## On My Mac...



CSE 486/586

8

## X.509 Certificates

- The most widely used standard format for certificates
- Format**
  - Subject:** Distinguished Name, Public Key
  - Issuer:** Distinguished Name, Signature
  - Period of validity:** Not Before Date, Not After Date
  - Administrative information:** Version, Serial Number
  - Extended information**
- Binds a public key to the subject
  - A subject: person, organization, etc.
- The binding is in the signature issued by an issuer.
  - You need to either trust the issuer directly or indirectly (by establishing a **root of trust**).

CSE 486/586

9

## X.509 Certificates

```

Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 1 (0x1)
        Serial Number: 7829 (0x1e95)
        Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting co.,
          CN=Certification Services Division,
          OU=Thawte Service, CF=mailAddress=new-cert@thawte.com
        Validity
            Not Before: Jul  9 16:04:02 1998 GMT
            Not After : Jul  9 16:04:02 1999 GMT
        Subject: CN=FreemSoft, OU=FreemSoft, CF=www.freemsoft.org, emailAddress=beccale@freemsoft.org
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                RSA Public Key (1024 bit)
                Modulus (1024 bit)
                00:e4:21:98:0a:0c:4b:62:1c:18:aa:0d:bd:b0:c8:bb:
                33:31:59:05:0f:46:18:91:17:16:6d:13:4d:ed:83:23:e1:
                66:38:d0:8e:56:12:44:ba:75:0b:a8:1c:9c:5b:5b:16:
                70:33:52:14:40:1a:cc:4c:65:13:51:70:39:0b:53:01:71:
                16:84:40:e0:e1:4d:05:61:05:1ca:b3:47:50:1b:0a:7b:
                03:00:20:6b:0c:13:93:01:16:0a:0f:7e:07:07:07:07:
                ff:a0:21:07:4e:0b:16:45:10:c1:0e:d7:18:03:e0:
                02:31:63:03:0a:8e:03:80:ea:7a:0c:1a:19:bc:0b:
                08:31:01:9a:27:152:7e:41:88
                -----
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
            93:5d:88:15:f0:05:f1:f2:f0:ab:a5:6d:f0:24:16:16:59:5a:9d:
            92:2a:4a:1b:3b:0a:78:9a:17:16:6d:13:4d:ed:83:23:e1:
            ab:12:4b:c0:d1:19:00:2e:30:43:03:03:16:e:0a:8b:0e:07:
            05:01:4e:f7:0c:15:00:17:9a:09:04:05:07:1c:1d:17:2:
            0d:13:aa:0d:4d:7a:de:a9:17:10:65:15:5a:89:0a:0f:19:d1:
            1a:0b:14:00:63:0d:0c:6d:5d:01:95:10:61:0b:16:02:09:07:
            ff:0c:fb:b1:f3:48:98:6e:6c:0c:f2:f2:9a:0b:fd:18:52:2:
            68:9f
    
```

CSE 486/586

10


## Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- SSL (Secure Socket Layer)** was developed by Netscape for electronic transaction security.
- SSL was adopted as **TLS** as an Internet standard.
- A protocol layer is added below the application layer for:
  - Negotiating encryption and authentication methods.
  - Bootstrapping secure communication
- It consists of two layers:
  - The **Record Protocol Layer** implements a secure channel by encrypting and authenticating messages
  - The **Handshake Layer** establishes and maintains a secure session between two nodes.

CSE 486/586

11

## TLS Protocol Stack



TLS protocols: [Handshake, Change Cipher Spec, Alert, Record] Other protocols: [HTTP, Telnet]


CSE 486/586

12

## TLS Record Protocol

- The record protocol takes an application message to be transmitted,

- fragments the data into manageable blocks,
- optionally compresses the data,
- computes a message authentication code (MAC),
- encrypts and
- adds a header.



CSE 486/586

13

## TLS Handshake Protocol

Cipher suite: a list of cryptographic algorithm supported by the client

### Phase 1: Establish security capabilities

ClientHello  
ServerHello

Establish protocol version, session ID, cipher suite, compression method, exchange random values

### Phase 2: Server authentication and key exchange

Certificate  
Certificate Request  
ServerHelloDone

Optionally send server certificate and request client certificate

### Phase 3: Client authentication and key exchange

Certificate  
Certificate Verify

Send client certificate response if requested

### Phase 4: Finish

Change Cipher Spec  
Finished

Change cipher suite and finish handshake

The client sends a change Cipher Spec message and copies the pending CipherSpec into the current CipherSpec.

CSE 486/586

14

## CSE 486/586 Administrivia

- PA4 due Friday next week
- Final: 5/12 (Thursday), 8am – 11am @ Knox 20

CSE 486/586

15

## Authentication


- Use of cryptography to have two principals verify each others' identities.
  - Direct authentication:** the server uses a shared secret key to authenticate the client.
  - Indirect authentication:** a trusted authentication server (third party) authenticates the client.
  - The authentication server knows keys of principals and generates temporary shared key (ticket) to an authenticated client. The ticket is used for messages in this session.
    - E.g., Verisign servers

CSE 486/586

16

## Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key




CSE 486/586

17

## "Optimized" Direct Authentication

- Authentication with a secret key with three messages




- Anything wrong with this?

CSE 486/586

18

## Reflection Attack



CSE 486/586

19


## Needham-Schroeder Authentication

- An **authentication server** provides secret keys.
  - Every client shares a secret key with the server to encrypt their channels.
- If a client A wants to communicate with another client B,
  - The server sends a key to the client A in **two forms**.
    - First, in a **plain form**, so that the client A can use it to encrypt its channel to the client B.
    - Second, in an **encrypted form** (with the client B's secret key), so that the client B can know that the key is valid.
  - The client A sends this encrypted key to the client B as well.
- Basis for Kerberos

CSE 486/586

20

## Needham-Schroeder Authentication




message

CSE 486/586

21

## Nonce $N_A$ in Message 1

Because we need to relate message 2 to message 1



CSE 486/586

22


## Kerberos

- Follows Needham-Schroeder closely
- Time values used for nonces
  - To prevent replay attacks
  - To enforce a lifetime for each ticket
- Very popular
  - An Internet standard
  - Default in MS Windows

CSE 486/586

23

## Kerberos



CSE 486/586

24

## Summary

- Digital certificates
  - Binds a public key to its owner
  - Establishes a chain of trust
- TLS
  - Provides an application-transparent way of secure communication
  - Uses digital certificates to verify the origin identity
- Authentication
  - Needham-Schroeder & Kerberos

CSE 486/586

25

## Acknowledgements

- These slides contain material developed and copyrighted by Indranil Gupta (UIUC), Jennifer Rexford (Princeton) and Michael Freedman (Princeton).

CSE 486/586

26